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Abstract
This thesis opens with a discussion of Rosa Luxemburg’s notion of “spontaneity,” which
departs from a consideration of Luxemburg’s scientific socialism, the inevitability of
capitalist collapse, and her assertion of socialism as the objective response to the
contradictions of capitalism. For Luxemburg, then, spontaneity refers to the way in which
proletarian consciousness forms in response to these conditions. The second chapter argues
that Luxemburg’s notion of spontaneity represents what Walter Benjamin would call an
historical articulation of the past, which is an articulation of the present and its struggles in
terms of their historicity. I develop this argument through a close reading of Benjamin’s
“Theses on the Philosophy of History,” with particular attention paid to Benjamin’s notion of
“weak messianism,” the historical burden of past generations’ failed revolutionary hopes that
the present carries. The third chapter considers the second volume of Alfred Döblin’s
November 1918 and the question of history’s commensurability.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis examines three different representations of collective action, which is action
undertaken by a group of people with the intention of achieving a common objective. The
first chapter discusses Rosa Luxemburg. Luxemburg was a scientific socialist, someone who
believed that capitalism is an inherently contradictory economic system. We experience
capitalism’s contradictions as economic meltdowns or crises such as the Great Recession of
2008. Scientific socialists believe these contradictions doom capitalism to collapse, but that
socialism is the scientific response to this inevitability. The chapter turns to Karl Marx’s
discussion of scientific socialism in order to understand how Luxemburg conceived of the
link between the contradictions of capitalism and collective action which arose in response.
Luxemburg calls this link “spontaneity,” which is associated with collective action that
seems to erupt spontaneously. For Luxemburg, such activity demonstrates how
consciousness, how we perceive the world, forms in relation to the contradictions of
capitalism and inspires collective action. The second chapter argues that Luxemburg’s notion
of spontaneity represents what Walter Benjamin calls the historical articulation of the past;
for Benjamin, we do this when we discuss something in terms of its historical development.
Luxemburg did exactly this when she discussed seemingly spontaneous action in terms of its
historical development. Such “articulations” shine a new light on events, for instance, which
then changes how we understand and respond to those events. For Luxemburg and Benjamin,
understanding collective action as an expression of capitalist oppression is what made social
revolution possible. The final chapter analyzes the second volume of Alfred Döblin’s fourpart novel, November 1918. The novel seems to ask whether it is actually possible for a
revolution to take place which would permanently end oppression, as it looks into history and
sees many efforts to achieve freedom all leading back to oppression.
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Introduction
The focus in each chapter of this thesis is the logic of collective action and the
temporality of social and political revolution, or the way in which each theorist or writer
interprets the content or experience of the present as a particular demand for action that will
transcend that present. My analysis focuses on three efforts to represent historical figurations
of collective action in the early twentieth century. The first chapter discusses Rosa
Luxemburg and her notion of spontaneity. For Luxemburg, the question of social revolution
was an interrogation of the present, in which the rudiments of an alternative social order
always already reside. Social revolution was then a matter of organizing and developing
consciousness in such a way that the masses recognized not only the manifold contingencies
of the inherited capitalist present, but also its unrealized, socialist potential. Spontaneity
represents a mass consciousness so developed that it has recognized these factors—a mass
consciousness for which the reality of its present condition has come into view to reveal a
socialist present which demands the proletariat reach out and grab it.
The second chapter examines the correspondences between Luxemburg and Walter
Benjamin in order to argue that spontaneity represents a form of historiography which
Benjamin refers to as the historical articulation of the past—a historiography which
represents the present in terms of its historicity. Thus, for Benjamin, to understand collective
action is to understand the way in which the past inhabits the present as a demand for the
fulfilment of “a secret agreement between past generations and the present one” (Benjamin
254). For if “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”
(Marx, Karl Marx 246), then what links the present to the past is the experience of each and
every present as class struggle—an experience of the present as history’s impulse toward that
which it has been promised. This is the impulse that Benjamin, in his “Theses on the
Philosophy of History,” famously calls “a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past
has a claim” (Benjamin 254). What Benjamin proposes here is a reformulation of Karl
Marx’s own reformulation of Hegel in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” For
history’s repetition is not a misrecognition of men’s farcical conjuring up of the past; it is the
past, which remains within each and every subsequent present as an indelible mark that
signifies the demand its claim be settled. Thus, for Benjamin, collective action must
disregard its “superstitious regard for the past,” not to turn its back on the past altogether, but
vi

to articulate its continued presence in terms of its historical significance to the present as that
which joins the various experiences of class struggle. Thus, the content of the past would
transcend the mediocrity (or ignorance) of its bourgeois phrasing to realize a present which
comes not from the future, but from the realization of that agreement which always already
resides within the present.
The final chapter considers the second volume of Alfred Döblin’s November 1918
and the possibility of history’s commensurability: not as a matter of finding the correct
articulation of the present’s demand to inspire collective action, but of coming to terms with
man’s inherent inadequacy, his inability to respond to the demand of history. The novel
conceives of the terms of fulfillment along lines not unlike the absolute justice or “justice as
relation to the other” that Jacques Derrida discusses in Specters of Marx: a justice given as
one does a gift, without expectation or condition, and with the messianic subtext of that
which has been long expected. This vision of justice does share in Benjamin’s messianic
conception of collective action, but Döblin’s novel considers this task to be an historical
articulation of a promise which is messianic in proportion—a task that requires an allencompassing view of creation. And men, the makers of history, are always at the tail-end of
their creation. It is somewhat fitting that Derrida ascribes absolute justice to a future, so long
as we consider the future the temporality of that which can never be experienced, of that
which is always “to come.” The realization of justice will bring an end to the experience of
the present, of history’s demand; its arrival is neither first nor last, but always after. In the
meantime, all one can do is find peace in the comfort of faith—the faith which brings the
souls of the faithful masses into accord with justice.
I chose the texts I focus on primarily in each chapter for the way in which they
articulate each figure’s conception of collective action. Thus, the first chapter opens with an
examination of Luxemburg’s “Reform or Revolution” and “What Is Economics,” which
contextualize her insistence on the inevitability of capitalism’s collapse. This insistence
informs much of Luxemburg’s theory, including the notion of spontaneity that she explores
in “The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade Unions,” the text which occupies most
of the first chapter’s discussion. The second chapter focuses primarily on Benjamin’s
“Theses on the Philosophy of History,” as this text offers a condensed explication of
Benjamin’s conception of history and its weak messianic impulse. I augment my discussion
of the “Theses” with passages from the “Theologico-Political Fragment,” “Doctrine of the
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Similar,” and The Arcades Project; while Benjamin composes these texts over two decades,
they evince an evolution in Benjamin’s thought that helps us to better understand his notion
of weak messianism and its correspondences to Luxemburg’s notion of spontaneity. As for
the final chapter, its discussion is limited to the second volume of Döblin’s November 1918
tetralogy, which is separated into two parts: A People Betrayed and The Troops Return. In
addition to being the most widely read, this volume represents its theory of history and
collective action as a choice between the divine and the historical—between the interior
peace of faith and the unending pursuit of peace in the historical through collective action. In
this way, this volume’s formulation of its problematic is highly compatible with the previous
chapter’s discussion of weak messianism, and I present these theories as a negation of the
emancipatory promise of such conceptions of history.
History is littered with revolutions of varying and debatable success, and theorists of
the left have long been concerned with the figuration of collective action in history. A
significant contribution to this tradition is Marx’s “Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,”
a text which stands in the background of each chapter in this thesis. Marx famously begins
“The Eighteenth Brumaire” with the observation, “Hegel remarks somewhere that all the
great events and characters of world history occur, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the
first time as tragedy, the second as farce” (Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire” 146). What follows
this corrective is an assertion of the broader conditions of historical action: “Men make their
own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have
chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly
confronted” (Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire” 146). As Marx puts it, “just when [men] appear to
be engaged in the revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material
surroundings, in the creation of something which does not yet exist, precisely in such epochs
of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them” (Marx,
“Eighteenth Brumaire” 146). This, for Marx, represents the temporality of the bourgeois
revolution, which needed to conjure up images of a glorious past to inspire “[the] heroism,
self-sacrifice, terror, civil war, and battles in which whole nations were engaged, to bring it
into the world” and accomplish its world historical task (Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire” 148).
The bourgeois revolutions cloaked themselves in imagery of Rome to proclaim that these
revolutions were dedicated to universal emancipation, which disguised their class character
even from the bourgeoisie itself. The only language available to such revolutions is that of
viii

the past, of what has been, and it carries with it an historical weight that limits its
emancipatory sweep, or as Marx puts it, “The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a
nightmare on the minds of the living” (Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire” 146). The proletarian
social revolution, by contrast, must create a new language, one that is free from the dead
weight of tradition and able to articulate that which is ineffable in the present. Only a
language such as this could inspire the collective action necessary to bring the “poetry from
the future” into the present.
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Chapter 1

1

Rosa Luxemburg and the Spontaneity of the Masses
Rosa Luxemburg is famously associated with the notion of spontaneity in

collective action, but her view on the role of spontaneity must be understood in the
context of her wider insistence on the necessity of scientific socialism and the
inevitability of the collapse of capitalism. In her 1900 essay, “Reform or Revolution,”
Luxemburg observes that “theories are only images of the phenomena of the exterior
world in the human consciousness” (Luxemburg 60). Some theories, she argues, present
inverted images, but not scientific socialism. For Luxemburg, the accuracy of socialist
theory rests on a “fundamental idea,” that capitalism produces the conditions of its own
impossibility. From that idea, she argues, three principal considerations follow: that
capitalism will become increasingly chaotic and will inevitably bring about its own ruin;
that capitalism itself produces through the socialization necessary to enlarge capitalist
enterprises the rudiments of the social order that would predominate under socialism; and
that the experience of struggle under capitalism only encourages the development of
proletarian organization and consciousness.1 It is important to keep in mind that
Luxemburg’s “Reform or Revolution” is a polemic text, a critique of the reformist
theories of Eduard Bernstein, a Marxist theorist and member of the Social Democratic
Party of Germany (SPD). Bernstein was a revisionist, who believed himself to be
“correcting” what he considered to be Marx’s “errors.” In Bernstein’s account, capitalism
is anything but doomed to collapse; rather, he argues, capitalism deploys certain
measures, “means of adaptation” to assuage social relations and to prevent crises, and
through those measures demonstrates an almost infinite capacity to adapt. Bernstein also
sees in the socialization of capitalist production the possibility of bringing capitalism’s
social tendencies increasingly to bear on the management of production and
consumption, eventually rendering it wholly social, and thus moving by reformist means
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entirely into a new socialist order. Though history did not and has not confirmed the view
of Bernstein and the Second International that capitalism will be inevitably transformed
into socialism by reformist means, it is nonetheless true that capitalism has proven to be
adaptable. As Fredric Jameson observes of the contemporary historical moment, so
infinite is capitalism’s adaptability and entrenchment in human society that it is easier to
imagine a future in which automation allows it to persist on an earth rendered
uninhabitable to humans, or as he puts it, “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than
to imagine the end of capitalism” (Jameson 76).
However, to see the persistence of capitalism as a refutation of Luxemburg’s
thesis is to fail to understand her articulation of the theory as a choice between socialism
and barbarism, as Luxemburg famously phrases it in the “Junius Pamphlet.” Luxemburg
wrote the pamphlet in response to the infamous events of August 14, 1914, when the
entire caucus of the SPD voted in favour of funding the war which would become World
War I. In the pamphlet, Luxemburg revisits Friedrich Engels’s articulation of this choice:
“‘Capitalist society faces a dilemma, either an advance to socialism or a reversion to
barbarism’” (qtd. in Luxemburg 388). She asks “What does a ‘reversion to barbarism
mean at the present stage of European civilization? . . . This world war means a reversion
to barbarism. The triumph of imperialism leads to the destruction of culture, sporadically
during a modern war, and forever, if the period of world wars that has just begun is
allowed to take its damnable course to the last ultimate consequence” (Luxemburg 388).
In many respects, the “Junius Pamphlet” is a restatement of the position Luxemburg sets
out in “Reform or Revolution,” affirming in particular the destruction of capitalism’s
imperialist tendency. This war, which Luxemburg ominously predicts will inaugurate
“the period of world wars,” puts not only capitalism’s destructive tendency on full
display, but also its insatiable hunger for growth at any cost.

1.1 Rosa Luxemburg and the Theory of Collapse
Luxemburg’s understanding of the relationship between the capitalist imperative
to grow or expand and the inevitability of its collapse is perhaps most fully set out in her
essay, “What is Economics,” the first chapter of a projected book on economics that was
to be based on the lectures she gave at the SPD party school from 1907 until WWI.
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Luxemburg’s essay begins with an interrogation of its titular question: “Sometimes
economics is simply defined as . . . the ‘science of the economic relations among human
beings’” (Luxemburg 324). But this definition does little more than raise a further
question: “is it necessary, and if so why, to have a special science about the economic
relations of ‘human beings,’ i.e., all human beings, at all times and under all conditions?”
(Luxemburg 324). For Luxemburg, economics studies the organization of production and
consumption, but that organization or mode of production is a human creation.
Consequently, economics is foremost a science of human relations and their
(re)production—but also their historical contingency. As Luxemburg insists, this science
should produce a clear understanding of the periodic crises produced from the dynamic of
those human relations. As she puts it,
What is noteworthy in all this is the fact that the crisis is looked upon and treated
by all concerned, by all of society, as something beyond the sphere of human
volition and beyond human control, as a heavy blow struck by an invisible and
greater power, an ordeal sent down from the heavens, similar to a heavy
thunderstorm, an earthquake, or a flood . . . as if [the crisis] were the result of the
workings of a natural law . . .
A thunderstorm is an event caused by the elements of physical nature, and
no one, at least not with the present development of the natural sciences and of
technology, is able to bring about or to prevent a thunderstorm. But what is a
modern crisis? It consists of the fact that too many commodities have been
produced. They find no purchasers, and therefore commerce and then industry
stop! (Luxemburg 334–35)
In contrast to the efforts of bourgeois economics to cast crises as the products of abstract
natural laws, Luxemburg insists that they are the product of specific, historical human
relations and that their causes are material. Bourgeois economics takes capitalism’s
historical relations as fixed and immutable and subject to abstract and immaterial laws or
principles. Luxemburg’s point is that economic crisis is as material as a thunderstorm—
except that the economic crisis arises from an historical social relation, the relations of
production: “No one wants a crisis and yet it happens. Man creates it with his own hands,
even though he does not want it for anything in the world. Here, in fact, we have before
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us a question of economic life which none of the participants can explain” (Luxemburg
335). Crises occur nonetheless, and they represent neither errors nor breakdowns but the
truth of the capitalist mode of production. They arise from a social relation, and it is the
perfect functioning of that relation which inevitably produces each crisis.
Luxemburg’s understanding of capitalist social relations and crisis is grounded in
part in Marx’s discussion of capitalism and cooperation. As Marx explains, “When
numerous workers work together side by side in accordance with a plan, whether in the
same process, or in a different but connected process, this form of labour is called
cooperation” (Marx, Capital: Vol. 1 443), and cooperation on a large scale distinguishes
capitalism from all preceding economic systems, particularly early capitalism, which was
“merely an enlargement of the workshop of the master craftsman of the guilds” (Marx,
Capital: Vol. 1 439). This large-scale cooperation in turn succeeds only because
capitalism preys upon pre-existing human sociality, as Marx argues: “man, if not as
Aristotle thought a political animal, is at all events a social animal” (Marx, Capital: Vol.
1 444). Capitalism, in other words, does not socialize man, but avails of man’s sociality
to express it capitalistically—the exact terms of which I return to below. Cooperation
produces what Marx describes as “the new power that arises from the fusion of many
powers,” but cooperation under capitalism also intensifies human sociality: “mere social
contact begets in most industries a rivalry and a stimulation of the ‘animal spirits,’ which
heightens the efficiency of each individual worker” (Marx, Capital: Vol. 1 443).
However, capitalist production socializes production neither for the sake of
increased production itself, nor to give man a means to express himself socially: “The
driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist production is the self-valorization of
capital to the greatest extent, i.e., the greatest possible production of surplus-value, hence
the greatest possible exploitation of labour-power by the capitalist” (Marx, Capital: Vol.
1 449). Valorization motivates the “twofold content” of capitalist production: “on the one
hand a social labour process for the creation of a product, and on the other hand capital’s
process of valorization—in form it is purely despotic” (Marx, Capital: Vol. 1 450). In
other words, capitalism’s social relations, its organization of man’s sociality, only
function to the extent that they produce surplus value. But when there is a glut of
commodities, surplus value falls, and we have a familiar crisis—and not necessarily
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because production exceeded the needs of consumption. There could be millions
homeless while a glut of homes sits empty because a “housing bubble” popped. This
scarcity despite abundance is, in many cases, a feature of capitalist crises: a need which,
materially and practically, could be satisfied, but which capitalism’s insatiable need for
surplus value blocks any socially valid practice from satisfying.2 Capitalism demands the
maximization of commodity production in order to maximize the potential for extracting
surplus value; meanwhile, it also restricts the conditions under which those commodities
can be consumed in order to, again, maximize surplus value. Capitalism demands scarcity
alongside abundance and, in this way, distorts the social relations of cooperation which
underlie it: “the interconnection between [workers’] various labours confronts them, in
the realm of ideas, as a plan drawn up by the capitalist, and, in practice, as his authority,
as the powerful will of a being outside them, who subjects their activity to his purpose”
(Marx, Capital: Vol. 1 450). Surplus value is that authority, and this is also the despotism
of capital: the absolute authority that surplus value holds over social relations, making
them increasingly about its production, while also distorting the cooperation which in fact
drives capital’s productivity. Insofar as barbarism is an absence of culture and
civilization, of social relations, the image of capitalism that Marx presents is
characterized by the barbaric disfiguring of sociality.
Another aspect of the logic of capital which confirms both its inherent barbarism
and the inevitability of its collapse is the imperative that capital expand. For Luxemburg
this imperative is typically realized through capital’s penetration of non-capitalist zones,
but in a finite world, capitalism will eventually exhaust those zones. Expansion will drive
capitalism to its limit, as opportunities for surplus value will dry up:
When capitalist development has reached a certain level, the interests of the
bourgeoisie, as a class, and the needs of economic progress begin to clash even in
the capitalist sense. We believe that this phase has already begun. It shows itself

2
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in two extremely important phenomena of contemporary social life: on the one
hand, the policy of tariff barriers, and on the other, militarism. (Luxemburg 82)
This “capitalist sense” is what Marx’s calls the “capitalist direction” of the economic
system’s “twofold content,” its production of both a product and surplus value. Tariffs
and militarism represent practices which states use to protect their capitalist interests
from competing interests abroad. While Luxemburg famously discusses capitalism’s need
for expansion in terms of imperialism, her argument points essentially to the historical
limit of capital—the point at which the threat of capitalism’s inevitable collapse
outweighs the utility of its socializing production to increase productivity. Tariffs and
militarism are, for Luxemburg, two striking signs that the current system is approaching
that limit. Whereas tariffs were originally intended to help fledgling sections, they now
serve the capitalist class at the national level, stoking rivalries with capitalists of other
nations and limiting consumption at the local level.3 And whereas militarism originally
facilitated capitalism’s imperialistic spread into formerly non-capitalist areas, it is now
also aimed internally to ensure the domination of the capitalist classes.4
That capitalism persists under conditions of endemic crisis is, for Luxemburg,
only a sure sign of its inevitable collapse, but that inevitability makes the struggle for
what will follow capitalism all the more urgent. As she puts it, “either the triumph of
imperialism and the destruction of all culture, and, as in ancient Rome, depopulation,
desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery; or the victory of socialism, that is, the
conscious struggle of the international proletariat against imperialism, against its
methods, against war. This is the dilemma of world history, its inevitable choice”
(Luxemburg 388–89). For Luxemburg, the barbarism of capitalism confirms that it has
reached its historical limit and must give way to another social form.
Luxemburg’s vision of this future social form is based on notions of free
cooperation. The sociality that enables this cooperation is not removed in her thought
from the notion of spontaneity. Once again, Marx can serve as a useful guide to the

3
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relation between these notions. In the section of his Grundrisse often referred to as “The
Fragment on Machines,” Marx explains how an embryonic communism already exists
within capitalism, which Marx discusses in terms of the mechanization of production. of
fixed capital, the machines “fixed” to the factory floor. Mechanization is a practice like
any other under capitalism, subject to the production of surplus value, but the effort to
maximize surplus value through mechanization also leads inevitably to the reduction of
“necessary labour.” As Marx explains, “[capital] is thus, despite itself, instrumental in
creating the means of social disposable time, in order to reduce labour time for the whole
society to a diminishing minimum, and thus to free everyone’s time for their own
development. But its tendency always, on the one side, to create disposable time, on the
other, to convert it into surplus labour” (Marx, Grundrisse 708). Mechanization can
reduce labor time and then can increase surplus value, but to the extent it reduces
necessary labour time, it also leads to surplus production and reduced opportunities for
surplus-value production—in a word, crisis. But the essential point remains: capitalist
mechanization and cooperation produces the means by which socially disposable time,
time for personal development, might be created for all.
Another way in which capitalism shows the way to its own surpassing is through
mechanization’s advancement of what Marx refers to in passing as “the general intellect”
(Marx, Grundrisse 706). Paolo Virno defines the general intellect as “abstract knowledge
(primarily but not only scientific knowledge)” (Virno 3). More specifically, Marx uses
the term to represent the way in which man’s sociality works—how innovation is in fact
a social product that relies directly and indirectly on the various products of others’
labour.5 The general intellect, or scientific knowledge as Virno defines it, is not a
necessarily capitalist phenomenon, but a feature of man’s sociality, as Marx explains:
“Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting
mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into
organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature” (Marx,
Grundrisse 706). Under capitalist relations, however, scientists or innovators are
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compensated within capitalist wage relations, even though their labour “is oriented
towards the production of fixed capital” and produces no commodities—only the
“means” to produce them. This organization even extends to the general intellect itself,
for which the productivity of those workers engaged in commodity production provides
the social validation for its development. Firms might acquire surplus value from the sale
of that knowledge which amounts to productivity advancements, but that transaction only
occurs under capitalism if commodity production produces surplus value to such an
extent that some can be diverted from circulation and the production of further surplus
value to invest in the production of the mode of production. The general intellect depends
as much on the knowledge of the scientist as the productivity of the workers.6 Its
development, somewhat outside capitalist relations, reveals the rudiments of an
alternative social order: productivity advances are not themselves capitalistic, but their
organization according to the production of surplus value is. This assertion recalls the
earlier discussion of Luxemburg’s “What Is Economics.” Economics studies the
organization of production and consumption, but the organization or mode of production
is a human creation in the sense that the labour of human relations produces it. Thus,
labour itself is not capitalistic—certainly, it is organized capitalistically, but labour and
its product, which includes productivity advancements, remain expressions of man’s
sociality. In this light, advances in productivity and in knowledge have consequences for
all human labour insofar as necessary labour is all labour necessary to reproduce social
relations. That these advancements can also support the production of surplus value in
their current articulation is not a feature of productivity advancement but of capitalism.

6

That the general intellect includes as much the “innovators” as those workers not directly involved in the
production of the mode of production is perhaps not immediately obvious because of capitalist abstraction:
both sets of people labour for the development of the general intellect and the reproduction of social
relations, but the demands of surplus value abstract social relations and artificially separate the two
practices.
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1.2

Spontaneity and “The Mass Strike”

Written in August of 1906 to interpret the significance of the various strikes in
Russia between 1905-06, Luxemburg’s “The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the
Trade Unions” is significant for the development of her thought and as a chronicle of the
mass strike as a form of action:
The present official period, so to speak, of the Russian Revolution is justly dated
from the rising of the proletariat on January 22, 1905, when the demonstration of
200,000 workers ended in a frightful bloodbath before the czar’s palace. The
bloody massacre in St. Petersburg was, as is well known, the signal for the
outbreak of the first gigantic series of mass strikes which spread over the whole of
Russia within a few days and which carried the call to action of the revolution
from St. Petersburg to every corner of the empire amongst the widest section of
the proletariat. (Luxemburg 237)
These events are among those which Luxemburg chronicles in her pamphlet’s third
section, the “Development of the Mass Strike Movement in Russia.” However, the text
opens with a reconsideration of “the general strike,” which Luxemburg presents as an
embryonic form of the mass strike: “For the first time in the history of class struggle [the
Russian Revolution] has achieved a grandiose realization of the idea of the mass strike
and—as we shall discuss later—has even matured the general strike and thereby opened a
new epoch in the development of the labor movement” (Luxemburg 227). Thus, “The
Mass Strike” is Luxemburg’s rehabilitation of the general strike from its
contemporaneous position within international socialism—perhaps best expressed in
Engels’s position on “the revolutionary blundering of the Bakuninists in Spain”
(Luxemburg 225). For Luxemburg, that position is not critical of the general strike itself,
but of “the anarchist theory of the general strike—that is, the theory of the general strike
as a means of inaugurating the social revolution, in contradistinction to the daily political
struggle of the working class” (Luxemburg 226).7 This position is, in other words, critical
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Luxemburg quotes Engels, who writes that “‘The general strike, in the Bakuninists’ program, is the lever
which will be used for introducing the social revolution. One fine morning all the workers in every industry
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of the anarchists’ ahistorical conception of the general strike, divorced from any
consideration of the relevance of particular forms of political action to class struggle.
Luxemburg holds that the various forms of strike action that predate the Russian
Revolution of 1905 are part and parcel of that revolution, constituting what Luxemburg
terms a revolutionary period. In her view, the mass strike was “the indication, the rallying
idea, of a whole period of class struggle lasting for years, perhaps for decades”
(Luxemburg 263). This assertion provides the basis for the first of Luxemburg’s four
“general aspects” of the mass strike, expressed in the notion that the mass strike is not the
one and only indication or rallying idea of class struggle, but that it was for that period.
The mass strike was spontaneous, and its spontaneity was for Luxemburg an expression
of the particular way in which consciousness developed in this period. The spontaneity
that Luxemburg observes in the mass strikes is an indication of the proletariat’s class
consciousness and, thus, its preparedness for its historical task. If “The history of all
hitherto existing society is,” as Marx suggests in “The Communist Manifesto,” “the
history of class struggles” (Marx, Karl Marx 246), then, for Luxemburg, its spontaneity is
its phenomenal expression. Broadly stated, for Luxemburg, the significance of any one
mass strike is not its singular existence, as a political action which occurred over a certain
span of time, but as an expression of consciousness that forms in reaction to the social
relations of a particular period of class struggle; while the mass strike, or any form of
political action, may seem spontaneous in a given moment, that spontaneity is in fact the
yearning of proletarian consciousness to throw off the yoke of capitalism and be truly
free.

1.2.1

Thesis 1: Luxemburg, the Historical Materialist
In the fourth section of “The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade

Unions,” entitled, “The Interaction of the Political and the Economic Struggle,”
Luxemburg formulates a series of theses on the correct understanding of the mass strike.

in a country, or perhaps in every country, will cease work, and thereby compel the ruling classes to submit
in about four weeks, or to launch an attack on the workers so that the latter will have the right to defend
themselves, and may use the opportunity to overthrow the old society.’” (qtd. in Luxemburg 225)
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The first of these theses contends that the mass strike should not be considered an
isolated action, but rather as part of a much larger process within a particular period of
class struggle, lasting sometimes for decades. This thesis serves as a reminder of the
materialist conception of history which underlies scientific socialism: while the
contradictions of capitalism necessarily inspire struggles for the realization of that
alternative social order which already exists within capitalism, the immediate outcomes
of those struggles are not a foregone conclusion. For this reason, Luxemburg’s discussion
of her first thesis opens on the distinction between “demonstration” and “fighting”
strikes, the former organized and designed to show a disciplined opposition and the latter
spontaneous and thus more concerned with the actual struggle.8 Luxemburg does not
disparage the more organized demonstration strike; rather, she insists on interpreting
them as signs of the development of class consciousness. She implies, to this end, that the
latter are more indicative of the relation between the development of consciousness and
political action; thus, strikes were a constituent of class struggle, and the form it took in
relation to class consciousness. Fighting strikes are, in other words, a sign that the
proletariat is becoming conscious of its role, and the spontaneity of these actions a sign of
that consciousness.
It follows, Luxemburg asserts, that the mass strike must be understood not as a
mechanism or strategic tool, but as an event embedded in the materialist logic of class
struggle. Hence, she argues that “it is not by subjective criticism of the mass strike from
the standpoint of what is desirable, but only by objective investigation of the sources of
the mass strike from the standpoint of what is historically inevitable, that the problem can
be grasped or even discussed” (Luxemburg 233). Subjective criticism, then, refers to
“abstract speculations on the possibility or impossibility, the utility or injuriousness of the
mass strike” (Luxemburg 233). It is this perspective that Luxemburg observes in German
Social Democracy’s account of the mass strike as an “isolated phenomenon” that is at all
times political, wholly without any economic motivations, “and undertaken on the basis
of an opportune and mutual understanding on the part of the controlling authorities of the

8

See Luxemburg 263-64.
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party and of the trade unions, and carried through in the spirit of party discipline and in
perfect order . . . the whole material balance of the mass strike . . . is exactly determined
in advance” (Luxemburg 235–36). However, this position merely represents a
“subjective” view of the mass strike, in terms of its perceived utility. Objective
investigation of the mass strike interprets these moments not as they appear, but in terms
of their historical situatedness, that is, as the phenomenal expression of class struggle.
Massimiliano Tomba makes a relevant observation to this end, in his reading of Marx’s
“Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”:
Marx shows that this model of linear causality is inadequate for the understanding
of revolutionary situations. The event belongs to the order of ruptures, “it cleaves
linear homogeneity, and fills the spatial void, it negates the abstraction of modern
temporality.” It is not history that is without events, rather it is a certain kind of
historiographical lens which does not allow one to see events. What is needed
instead is a historiography that is up to this task. The materialist historiographer
attempts to do this, intervening not only in the history of the present but in that of
the past as well. (Tomba 37–38)
This is exactly the sort of “objective investigation” Luxemburg undertakes in her
description of the mass strike as the indication of a whole period of class struggle lasting
sometimes for decades. To the extent that the strike constitutes a rupture, it is also a
moment in the ongoing course of class struggle, and the spontaneity that may attend it is
a measure of the proletariat’s development of class consciousness.

1.2.2

Thesis 2: The Economic and the Political, or the Lenin and
Luxemburg Debate
For Luxemburg, mass strikes are not singular; they are not isolated actions, with a

clear beginning and ending. In the historical example she discusses, they are an indication
of that phase of class struggle that culminated in the Russian Revolution of 1905 but, in
fact, began “five or six years” earlier with “the great general strike of the textile workers
in St. Petersburg in 1896 and 1897” (Luxemburg 237). Luxemburg herself admits that the
demands of this strike were “economic”: “first, payment of wages for the coronation
holidays; second, a working day of ten hours; third, increased rates for piecework . . . the
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mass strike was outwardly a mere economic struggle for wages, but the attitude of the
government and the agitation of the social democracy made it a political phenomenon of
the first rank” (Luxemburg 238). This mass action was followed by “The outbreak of the
Caucasian strike in March 1902,” which was “as much due to purely economic partial
causes (although produced by quite other factors) as that of 1896” (Luxemburg 239).
Luxemburg continues to recount various strike actions throughout the section, all of
which contain similar revolts against the further denigration of already poor working
conditions. In each instance, workers first demanded improved wages and working
conditions, but the demands of thoroughly proletarianized masses always exceeded their
initial, economic articulation and became political: “even here there was no
predetermined plan, no organized action, because the appeals of the parties could scarcely
keep pace with the spontaneous risings of the masses . . . the economic factor and the
scattered condition of trade unionism were the starting point; all-embracing class action
and political direction the result” (Luxemburg 246). Here, again, the “spontaneity” of the
masses acts as the sign of the masses’ development.
Luxemburg insists, moreover, that this record of strikes and demonstrations
reveals the absolute reciprocity between the political and economic aspects of class
struggle.9 Spontaneity provides a means to gauge the revolutionary potency of a
particular phase of class struggle, of the workers’ awareness of the actual political
condition that underlies their economic woes. With a revolutionary fervour sweeping
through much of the industrialized world, the nature of the relationship between the
economic and the political was a highly contentious matter for Social Democrats. This
relationship—not spontaneity—is among one of the several debates between V.I. Lenin
and Luxemburg. Both Luxemburg and Lenin are concerned with development of
proletarian consciousness, but Lenin is particularly concerned with the successful
development of revolutionary or social-democratic consciousness in the proletariat, and
the obstacles posed by the limit of spontaneous trade-unionism. His view on

9

“With the spreading, clarifying and involution of the political struggle, the economic struggle not only
does not recede, but extends, organizes and becomes involved in equal measure. Between the two there is
the most complete reciprocal action” (Luxemburg 267).
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“spontaneity” is part of a polemic within the Russian situation, one that has often been
overlooked, but which has recently been explored by Lars T. Lih’s historical
contextualization of WITBD, Lenin Rediscovered.
As Lih reminds us, an integral point to remember is that Lenin’s WITBD is a
polemic text, much like Luxemburg’s “Reform or Revolution.” Both are affirmations of
scientific socialism, intended to put theoretical debates to rest:
[Lenin] is affirming something rather banal and non-controversial for Social
Democrats. He is affirming the mission of Social Democracy to bring the socialist
message to the workers as vigorously as possible. He is affirming that trediunionizm [trade-unionism]—an ideology that explicitly denies the need for Social
Democracy—is a bad thing and needs to be combatted. He affirms these precisely
because he assumes, correctly, that his intended readers and even his opponents
regard them as axioms. (Lih 615)
This affirmation of Social Democracy is more specifically an affirmation of its insistence
upon class struggle, as opposed to the “economism” of trade unionism: “‘-ism’ means an
ideology, which [for economism] is: ‘a restriction to economic struggle defended as a
matter either of principle or of long-term tactics’” (Lih 220). As Lih explains it, trade
unionism overestimates the significance of the economic struggle in class struggle insofar
as it restricts struggle to wage strikes and other forms of struggle typically undertaken by
unions. Social Democracy, by contrast, holds the political struggle for an alternative
social order to be the highest form of class struggle.
The “spontaneity” which Lenin criticizes is that which is typically associated with
the economism of trade unionism. While it is in many ways similar to the spontaneity
Luxemburg discusses in “The Mass Strike,” Lenin’s discussion is, again, limited to a very
particular and largely forgotten context, which, as Lih carefully demonstrates, has also
suffered from translation issues. As Lih notes, “the natural translation for stikhiinyi is
elemental,” but its derivatives make for an awkward translation in English (Lih 618).10
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“First, English happens to lack a familiar word for the abstract noun form of ‘elemental.’ One can find in
dictionaries words such as ‘elementalness’ and ‘elementality,’ but they grate on the ear . . . Second, the
phrase ‘the stikhiinyi element,’ used originally by Krichevskii, plays a large role in WITBD polemics” (Lih
618).
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Instead, Lih opts to transliterate the word from the original Russian: the abstract noun
stikhiinost instead of spontaneity, and the adjective stikhiinyi instead of spontaneous (Lih
617). The awkwardness of “elemental” does make “spontaneity” a somewhat sympathetic
translation, as “both words revolve around lack of control” (Lih 620), but their
connotations differ critically—especially politically. In English, spontaneity is often
associated with freedom: “in Lenin’s era, Woodrow Wilson writes ‘The highest and best
form of efficiency is the spontaneous co-operation of a free people’” (Lih 619).11 But
whereas spontaneity is an achievement, something to be desired, stikhiinost is a point of
departure. As Lih explains, the Russian term’s etymology evolves from an association
with “the basic elements of the universe,” and this leads more or less directly to the
modern Russian term, stikhiinost, “an element of the universe, a force of nature that is
powerful and uncontrollable” (Lih 617). Though the notion of spontaneity as a political
force might suggest an ability to transcend the world, to make the politically impossible a
reality, it can equally suggest a chaotic and destructive scourge:
The basic metaphor of an uncontrollable natural force was a rich one and various
aspects of it could be activated at various times to varying effect. For example, if
the revolution itself or the growth of awareness among the workers was moving
forward like an unstoppable natural force, that was a good and encouraging thing.
If, on the other hand, a strike action was called stikhiinyi and thus implicitly
compared to a hurricane, that was mostly a bad thing: violent, unpredictable,
disorganised, short-lived, destructive, exhausting. (Lih 621)
As for Lenin, the object of his criticism is not this stikhiinyi action itself, but economistic
articulations, which idealize the masses left to their own devices, without leadership or
guidance from Social Democracy. It is the squandering of stikhiinost, as it has one
particular significance to the masses: “the stikhiinost of the masses demands from us, the
Social Democrats, a mass of purposiveness. The greater is the stikhiinyi upsurge of the
masses and the wider becomes the movement, so much the more does the demand
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Spontaneity has broadly positive associations in English, as Lih notes in a second, “more popular”
connotation, “connected to fun: to be spontaneous is to be impulsive in a cheerful way, to be charmingly
unexpected” (620)
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increase for a mass of purposiveness in the theoretical, the political and the organisational
work of Social Democracy” (Lenin, WITBD 721). Earlier he writes that “the ‘stikhiinyi’
element is, in essence, nothing other than the embryonic form of purposiveness” (Lenin,
WITBD 701). Stikhiinost is an indication of the development of “consciousness” in the
masses, to which the Social Democrats must respond accordingly.
At this point, Lenin’s account of stikhiinost overlaps somewhat with Luxemburg’s
of spontaneity: both are interpretations of what each sees as the significance of sudden
mass action to Social Democrats. Moreover, Luxemburg also differentiates between the
significance of different strike types in “The Mass Strike” and would likely agree with
Lenin’s sentiment that “there are different kinds of stikhiinost” (Lenin, WITBD 701). For
Lenin, there is the stikhiinost of Russian strikes in the 1860s and 1870s, stikhiinost which
resulted in the “‘stikhiinyi’ destruction of machines and so on,” that is, action which
suggests little knowledge of the potential for collective action. But then there is also “the
wholesale character” of worker strikes in response to the Petersburg industrial war of
1896: “if we are going to talk about the people’s movement that was newly rising up, and
if we are going to talk about the ‘stikhiinyi element,’ then, of course, it is precisely this
strike movement that one must call ‘stikhiinyi’ before anything else” (Lenin, WITBD
701). That is action in which the masses appear as a collective, acting in direct response
to a particular event—an indication of their growing knowledge and the power of
collective action.
However, this is the point at which Lenin’s and Luxemburg’s accounts diverge.
Whereas Luxemburg describes the spontaneity of the mass strike in her first thesis as the
indication of a whole period of class struggle, Lenin limits the stikhiinost of the masses to
an indication of bourgeoning consciousness and preparedness to begin class struggle:
If the earlier riots had been the uprising simply of oppressed people, then these
systematic strikes already expressed the embryo of a class struggle—but, indeed,
no more than the embryo. Taken in isolation, these strikes were simply trediunionist [trade-unionist] struggle, but not yet a Social-Democratic one: they bore
witness to the awakening of the antagonism between workers and owners, but
there did not exist among these workers—nor could it have existed at that time—
an awareness of the irreconcilable opposition of their interests to the entire
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political and social order, in other words, a Social-Democratic awareness. (Lenin,
WITBD 701–02)
The worker movement gives voice to the antagonisms inherent in productive relations
under capitalism, but that does not necessarily lead to the development of a political
consciousness. Lenin describes the development of consciousness, from economic to
political, in terms of the relationship between “purposiveness” and “awareness.” 12 In
Lih’s reading,
The simplest way to put the relationship is that “awareness” is knowledge that
guides action while ‘purposiveness’ is action guided by knowledge. “Awareness”
is not just neutral knowledge, but the kind of knowledge that impels and compels
action—the knowledge, for example, of one’s historical mission. “Purposiveness”
is a quality of action. When action is controlled by knowledge—by a firm and
clear sense of purpose and by a solid grasp of ends and means—it is purposive.
(Lih 338)
While Lenin and Luxemburg both oppose the economism of Bernstein and the Second
International, and consider it the path to opportunism,13 they would appear to hold
different views on the relation of the economic to the political in the development of class
struggle. For his part, Lenin suggests that we might regard the economic and the political
aspects of the struggle as largely, if not wholly, distinct:
Is it true that economic struggle is in general “the most widely applicable means”
of drawing the masses into the political struggle? Completely untrue. A no less
“widely applicable” means of “drawing in” is each and every manifestation of
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Lih explains the translation of “purposiveness” and “awareness” as follows: “Russian Social Democrats
talked about the soznatel’nyi rabochii as a worker with the right kind of soznanie. According to the usual
translation, the figure under discussion is the conscious worker with the right kind of consciousness.
According to the translation adopted in this commentary, he or she is the purposive worker with the right
kind of awareness” (Lih 337). It should be further noted that soznanie refers to “different theories of the
world: Social-Democratic, tred-iunionist [trade-unionist], and so on. Soznanie is often used in WITBD in
the much less political sense of simple awareness of the world and one’s own actions” (338).
13

Luxemburg premises her comments on the inevitability of capitalist collapse in “Reform or Revolution”
on a refutation of Bernstein’s reformist theories. And Lenin, for his part, critiques Bernstein’s “new critical
tendency” in similar fashion in WITBD: “Anyone who doesn’t deliberately shut his eyes cannot help seeing
that the new ‘critical’ tendency in socialism is nothing other than a new variety of opportunism” (683).
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police oppression and autocratic outrage—and definitely not just manifestations
tied to the economic struggle . . . in the general sum of the day-to-day occurrences
in which the worker suffers (either in his own person or in the person of those
close to him) from lack of rights, abuse of power and violence, there is no doubt
that only a small minority consists of police oppression that is specific to the class
struggle.” (Lenin, WITBD 728–29)
In this passage, Lenin insists that the motivation for and development of political
consciousness is to be found in the response to oppression in whatever form, whether it is
the economic oppression of the factory floor or the political oppression of the state.14
Lenin does not critique Luxemburg directly in this section or in any part of WITBD, but
he does criticize this aspect of her thought elsewhere, calling it “the whole notorious
organisation-as-process theory” (Lenin, Fine Words Butter No Parsnips).
For Luxemburg, however, there is finally no separation between the political and
the economic aspects of class struggle. This relationship is the topic of her second thesis
on the mass strike: “it is impossible to separate the economic factors from one another.
Here also the reality deviates from the theoretical scheme, and the pedantic representation
in which the pure political mass strike is logically derived from the trade-union general
strike as the ripest and highest stage, but at the same time kept distinct from it, is shown
to be absolutely false” (Luxemburg 266). On this point, Luxemburg distinguishes herself
from Lenin, for whom the pure political mass strike, in which the political has ostensibly
overtaken the economic and the trade unions have likewise faded into the background of
the revolution, would constitute the highest form of strike, as well as the indication of the
proletariat’s discipline and preparedness for revolution.
It is not that Luxemburg rejects the organization that this level of preparedness
entails, a criticism typical of misinterpretations of her work. Rather, she sees class
struggle, organization, and thus revolution as, indeed, a process—not because revolution
is an inevitability, but because history is class struggle and contingent. Thus, Luxemburg
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Lih explain Lenin’s differentiation as follows: “Political agitation is unlike economic agitation first
because it deals with the state as opposed to factory life, but also (Lenin is very concerned to make this
point) because it deals with abuses and outrages directed at all classes, not just workers” (Lih 579).
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rejects “the pedantic representation” of the mass strike, that which dissects it into its
ostensible parts. Class struggle is the subject of history and it takes various forms and
follows complex trajectories:
[T]he economic struggle is the transmitter from one political center to another; the
political struggle is the periodic fertilization of the soil for the economic struggle.
Cause and effect here continually change places; and thus the economic and the
political factor in the period of the mass strike, now widely removed, completely
separated or even mutually exclusive, as the theoretical plan would have them,
merely form the two interlacing sides of the proletarian struggle in Russia. And
their unity is precisely the mass strike. (Luxemburg 268)
Luxemburg’s discussion recalls Marx’s argument in the “Fragment”: that the
contradictions of surplus value both conceal an embryonic communism and inspire
struggles which are in fact for that alternative social order. When workers strike for an
eight-hour workday, for instance, they fight to increase the time for social reproduction,
which comes at the cost of surplus-labour time. They fight to loosen the strangle hold that
the demand for surplus value places on social relations and ultimately for a future in
which surplus value no longer organizes social relations. In other words, they fight for
communism.15 Thus, the economic and the political are always already united, even if
they may occasionally appear otherwise. This is the view that informs the eighth section
of “The Mass Strike,” “Need for United Action of Trade Unions and Social Democracy,”
in which Luxemburg asserts, “the separation of the political and the economic struggle
and the independence of each is nothing but an artificial product of the parliamentarian
period, even if historically determined” (Luxemburg 299). For Luxemburg, the unity of
the political and the economic does not depend on appearance, but upon the objective
logic of class struggle. It is not a not a question of whether the economic and the political
are united, but rather one of recognizing that they are always already united. Their
apparent separation can only be, in this context, merely a ruse imposed by the dominant
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See Luxemburg 82-87.
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class, or a contingent deformation representative of the current historical moment in the
class struggle.

1.2.3

Theses 3 and 4: Mass Strike as Revolution
If economic struggles are fights for communism, as Luxemburg sees it, the mass

strike comes from the revolution. In her introduction to “The Mass Strike,” Mary-Alice
Waters suggests that “[Luxemburg] tends to go too far in the direction of equating the
mass strike with the revolution itself” (Luxemburg 222). 16 Luxemburg’s third thesis on
the mass strike, that “the mass strike is inseparable from the revolution” (Luxemburg
268), might appear to confirm that view, as would her latter assertion that “in reality the
mass strike does not produce the revolution, but the revolution produces the mass strike”
(Luxemburg 270). But the mass strike and revolution are far from identical in
Luxemburg’s account. They are, rather, simply linked as moments in class struggle
through what Luxemburg labels alternately as spontaneity or consciousness, the
underlying force that is present in every moment of class struggle, including both the
mass strike and the revolution. As she describes it, “the mass strike is . . . the method of
motion of the proletarian mass, the phenomenal form of the proletarian struggle in the
revolution” (Luxemburg 263). Whether we discuss the mass strike or the revolution, the
topic at hand is always the development of mass consciousness within the conditions of
class struggle. Thus, the mass strike is also the “method” or expression of this mass
consciousness in its “movement” toward revolution. And any differentiation between the
mass strike and the revolution is counterproductive—a subjective critique that overvalues
the immediate appearance of this “phenomenal form” and thus attributes to it something
desirable, some practical end.

16

Geras addresses this order of arguments against Luxemburg: “Amongst the misconceptions by which
Rosa Luxemburg’s thought has been deformed, the most widespread and tenacious is, without doubt, that
which attributes to her a thesis going variously under the names of determinism, fatalism and spontaneism”
(13). While Waters does not explicitly qualify her criticism in these terms, it is based in a failure to
understand that Luxemburg’s criticisms of the various ways in which class struggle is dissected conceals its
actual unity as the history of class struggle.
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Luxemburg’s fourth thesis is concerned with the consequences of this
overvaluation, in regards to which she makes the following famous argument: “in the
mass strikes in Russia the element of spontaneity plays such a predominant part, not
because the Russian Proletarian are ‘uneducated,’ but because revolutions do not allow
anyone to play the schoolmaster with them” (Luxemburg 272). Class struggle may be a
relatively simple concept in the abstract; however, the reality of class struggle, its
experience, is highly complex, with a multitude of variables that are always evolving:
The element of spontaneity, as we have seen, plays a great part in all Russian
mass strikes without exception, be it as a driving force or as a restraining
influence. This does not occur in Russia, however, because social democracy is
still young or weak, but because in every individual act of the struggle so very
many important economic, political and social, general and local, material and
psychical, factors react upon one another in such a way that no single act can be
arranged and resolved as if it were a mathematical problem. (Luxemburg 272)
Spontaneity, which for Luxemburg expresses political consciousness, appears most
dramatically in particular and extraordinary moments of class struggle. But those
moments are themselves wildly overdetermined, moments in which there are so many
factors whirling around—the economic, political, social, and so on—that they cannot be
arranged or ordered into a formal, mathematical account of the sequence of action, cause,
effect. Thus, practical ends place artificial boundaries around spontaneous action and
overdetermine it. This situation also resembles the false disunity of the economic and the
political; this is because both operate according to the logic of capitalism and virtually
guarantee the persistence of capitalism. Social democracy’s continued separation from
trade unions does not resist the very notion of government operating only to further the
interests of a particular class—it is the very sign of not only that situation’s persistence,
but also the continuation of governments throwing the masses a few scraps, only to yank
them away with a change in government or an economic crisis. A wage strike that ends
once better wages are secured does not resist wage slavery and alienated labour—it
guarantees further strikes, many of which workers are bound to lose. To succeed, the
logic of class struggle would be necessarily incompatible with capitalist logic; as
Luxemburg puts it, “the revolution [is] above all a thoroughgoing internal reversal of
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social class relations” (Luxemburg 268). Marx’s theorization of the emergence of
communism from capitalism is instructive in this regard, for it suggests that communism
also resides within capitalism—that the very undoing of capitalist logic resides within it.
In this way, communism inhabits every moment in history, waiting to burst forth, and
spontaneity is an expression of that—a brief moment of recognition that must be allowed
to play out and bring communism with it.
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Chapter 2

2

Walter Benjamin and the Historical Articulation of the
Past
Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” is, in one sense, a

meditation on class struggle. For Benjamin, the dynamic of history and historical struggle
is framed by the distinction he draws between two modes of historical understanding,
historicism and historical materialism. Historicism, Benjamin argues, represents an
historiographic method which claims “to recognize [the past] ‘the way it really was’”
(Benjamin, Illuminations 255), in which historical events appear as little more than an
accumulation of dead facts: “one asks with whom the adherents of historicism actually
empathize. The answer is inevitable: with the victor” (Benjamin, Illuminations 256). This
view of the past presents history as a succession of rational and even necessary regimes
of domination, whereas materialist historiography takes the exact opposite approach. Its
method is what Benjamin calls the “historical articulation of the past,” which “means to
seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger” (Benjamin, Illuminations
255). History, in other words, is to be read not through accumulation and continuity, but
through discontinuities and ruptures. This chapter focuses on how these opposing
conceptions of history explain the significance of the past to the present. Whereas
historicism limits the meaning of past atrocities, materialist historiography sees history in
terms of the continuity of class struggle. To deny the past’s continuing significance is to
deny meaning to present oppression. That is to say, class struggle is meaningful, but
where does this meaning come from? Benjamin’s answer in the “Theses” is the past,
those events which determined the victors and present-day rulers. Thus, historiography is
an overwhelmingly political practice. The failure to report on that historical line which
appears between past and present oppression turns a blind eye to its full meaning and so
affirms that oppression as right and good by virtue of its happening. For this reason, the
historical materialist is interested in the possibility of revolutionary ruptures and the
possibility of finally overturning the endless succession of domination and misery.
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Benjamin alludes indirectly to Luxemburg in his twelfth thesis, in which he
mentions the Spartacist Group: “Not man or men but the struggling, oppressed class itself
is the depository of historical knowledge. In Marx it appears as the last enslaved class, as
the avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of the
downtrodden. This conviction . . . had a brief resurgence in the Spartacist group”
(Benjamin, Illuminations 260). The “Spartacist Manifesto” would certainly seem to
confirm Benjamin’s view:
Proletarians of all countries! This must be the last war! We owe that to the twelve
million murdered victims; we owe that to our children; we owe that to humanity.
Europe has been ruined through the infamous international murder. Twelve
million bodies cover the gruesome scenes of the imperialistic crime. The flower
of youth and the best men of the nations have been mowed down. Uncounted
productive forces have been annihilated. Humanity is almost ready to bleed to
death from the bloodletting. Victors and vanquished stand at the edge of the
abyss. Humanity is threatened with the most dreadful famine, a halting of the
entire mechanism of production, plagues, and degeneration. (Kaes et al. 37)
Benjamin’s twelfth thesis makes it clear that the proletariat are at a loss, not for social
democratic parties which claim to protect their interests, but for those which see those
interests as a concern of a present which is the product of the history of class struggle, the
history of all hitherto existing society: “Social Democracy thought fit to assign to the
working class the role of the redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the
sinews of its strength. This training made the working class forget both its hatred and its
spirit of sacrifice, for both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than
that of liberated grandchildren” (Benjamin, Illuminations 260). The “Spartacist
Manifesto” presents the war in terms of this image: not as a sacrifice for some future
hope, but one demanded by imperialistic forces which will make no personal sacrifice,
but which stand to gain everything. Through a reading of the work of Walter Benjamin,
this chapter argues by extension that Luxemburg’s notion of spontaneity represents an
historical articulation of the past—that Luxemburg recognizes the entire history of
capitalist oppression, abridged in that eruptive moment of struggle.
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2.1 Temporality of Redemption: Walter Benjamin’s
Materialist View of History
Benjamin and Luxemburg share both a materialist view of history and an
understanding that the capitalist present poses a choice between socialism and barbarism.
Whereas Luxemburg positions herself explicitly in those terms in the “Junius Pamphlet,”
Benjamin alludes to them in his seventh thesis of and then the full name of the text.
However, he sets the ground for these terms in the first thesis, in which he discusses the
“automaton” and “puppet called ‘historical materialism’” (Benjamin, Illuminations 253).
According to Michael Löwy, understanding the significance of this puppet hinges on the
quotation marks which enclose historical materialism:
The use of quotation marks and the way this is phrased suggest that this
automaton is not ‘true’ historical materialism, but something that is given that
name. By whom, we ask. And the answer must be the chief spokesmen of
Marxism in his period, that is to say the ideologues of the Second and Third
Internationals. In Benjamin’s view, historical materialism actually becomes in
their hands a method that perceives history as akin to a machine leading
‘automatically’ to the triumph of socialism. (Löwy 25)
The Second and Third Internationals perceive the arrival of socialism as automatic, the
logical and inevitable conclusion of “the development of the productive forces, economic
progress, the ‘laws of history’” (Löwy 25). This is what Benjamin refers to elsewhere in
the “Theses” as progress. For Benjamin, this false “historical materialism” is particularly
significant in terms of theory and practice because it encourages the view that the
succession of suffering and oppression in history is borne by little more than pawns,
expendable to the greater end of socialism—because, ultimately, historical materialism
will capture capitalism’s king. Through the euphemism “automatic,” this perspective
actually encourages passivity or inaction. In Benjamin’s “Theses,” the historical
materialism of the Internationals is ultimately theological in that it simply embraces the
mystified view that socialism is inevitable. This assertion might seem odd, considering
the theological underpinnings of Benjamin’s “Theses.” But whereas Benjamin only
attributes a “weak Messianic power” to the present, we could extrapolate from
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Benjamin’s “Theologico-Political Fragment” that the Internationals would need an actual
Messiah to inaugurate socialism: “Only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in
the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the Messianic. For this
reason nothing historical can relate itself on its own account to anything Messianic.
Therefore the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical dynamic” (Benjamin,
One-Way 155). Historical materialism is for Benjamin something like theology. It
understands the “history of all hitherto existing society” as “the history of class struggles”
(Marx, Karl Marx 246), and it hopes without guarantee for a resolution not unlike the
Messiah’s consummation of history. The historical materialism of the Second and Third
Internationals, however, is exactly the opposite of a real historical materialist view, which
is scientific and active. As Richard Wolin points out, Benjamin’s notion of the
theological demands action in the present: “It remains temporal man’s ethical
responsibility to take a stand, despite the often contradictory and confused manner in
which the choices present themselves in the prosaic context of empirical life” (Wolin
118).
In contrast to the passivity of the automaton, Benjamin focusses on the urgency of
the capitalist present: “the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but
the rule” (Benjamin, Illuminations 257). The state of emergency serves as an alternative
formulation of the choice between socialism and barbarism: the present is always under
threat (by capitalist barbarism), and the only answer is to bring this (the capitalist) phase
of history to a close (with a social revolution). This formulation, however, characterizes
the choice as a demand for action peculiar to the present, experienced as what Benjamin
calls “the now” in a subsequent thesis: “History is the subject of a structure whose site is
not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now” (Benjamin,
Illuminations 261). Using the same oppositional logic that he employs in his discussion
of materialist historiography and historicism, Benjamin opposes the temporality of the
now to that of progress, referred to here as homogenous, empty time. This logic produces
two opposing constellations that Benjamin uses to affirm the objectivity of materialist
historiography. In one constellation, historicism coincides with progress; its homogenous,
empty time continues historicism’s limiting historical truth to the past. In the second
constellation, materialist historiography coincides with the present expressed through the
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temporality of “the now.” As Marx argues in the “Eighteenth Brumaire,” history is of
man’s making, but under the manifold contingencies of its inherited condition. The now’s
articulation of the present is premised on this inherited condition, which it represents as
the “fullness” of the present—the past’s significance to the present.
In Benjamin’s view, the experience of the present is comprised of fragments from
the past. For experience to be objective it must be premised on an understanding of the
past’s significance to the present: to know the present is to recognize the past’s claim on
the present, its demand for redemption. As a mode of representation, the historical
articulation of the past is based in epistemology and experience, and I begin first with its
epistemology. As Alison Ross notes of Benjamin, “his conception of the ‘historical
object,’ which epitomises his theory of historical knowledge, stands and falls with the
theological view of history” (Ross 99). This reliance on theology may seem contradictory
at first. For the divine realm of the theological is antithetical to the profane realm of the
historical: where the divine is complete and permanent, the political is fragmented and
contingent, indeed, historical. However, it is the divine’s permanence that, for Benjamin,
makes meaning reliable and thus possible: “Whatever the changes in Benjamin’s
understanding of theology in the course of his career may have been, he retained the view
that without theology the interpretation of reality (i.e., the ascription of meaning to
circumstances and events) would inescapably lead to confusion (the ‘chaos of symbols’)
and hence anxiety, and even to mythic empowerment of ‘daemonic’ forces” (Ross 99).
Two essays connect Benjamin’s early theological epistemology to his later theory
of historical knowledge: “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,” written
1920-21, and “Doctrine of the Similar,” written 1933. In the first essay, he discusses the
divine foundation of meaning:
The translation of the language of things into that of man is not only a translation
of the mute into the sonic; it is also the translation of the nameless into name. It is
therefore the translation of an imperfect language into a more perfect one, and
cannot but add something to it, namely knowledge. The objectivity of this
translation is, however, guaranteed by God. For God created things; the creative
word in them is the germ of the cognizing name, just as God, too, finally named
each thing after it was created. But obviously this naming is only an expression of
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the identity of the creative word and the cognizing name in God, not the prior
solution of the task that God expressly assigns to man himself: that of naming
things. (Benjamin, One-Way 117–18)
The significance of this excerpt lies in its differentiation between the “language of
things” and the language of man.” Naming “translates” God’s language of thing into
man’s: “The proper name is the communion of man with the creative word of God”
(Benjamin, One-Way 116). God thus vouchsafes the reliable meaning and the
communication of the thing’s essence in naming:
“The task of naming given to Adam by God . . . underlines the creative vocation
of humans. The ‘creative word’ of God is the ground of the human being’s
possibility of ‘communication’ with things . . . The translation (and perfection) of
the language of things into human language is Benjamin’s conception of
(genuine) knowledge, and remains so throughout his writing . . . In the naming
language, human being’s ‘meaning something’ is immediately fulfilled, thanks to
the linguistic essence of things, and hence the world is transparently
meaningful.’” (Ross 82–83)
Benjamin then address man’s access to meaning in the “Doctrine of the Similar,” in
which man is said to still be able to communicate things, their essence, but only by the
less direct recognition of non-sensuous similitude:17 “The perception of similarity is in
every case bound to an instantaneous flash. It slips past, can possibly be regained, but
really cannot be held fast, unlike other perceptions” (Benjamin, “Doctrine” 66).
Astrology provides example of such a similarity which, for Benjamin, “nature produces.”
That is to say, God’s creation produces these similarities as “a fundamental importance
for the illumination of large areas of occult knowledge” (Benjamin, “Doctrine” 65),
recognition of the similar momentarily recalls that mythic condition of language that man
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See Ross on the connection between “On Language” and “Doctrine of the Similar”: “In the naming
language, human being’s ‘meaning something’ is immediately fulfilled, thanks to the linguistic essence of
things, and hence the word is transparently meaningful. In the post-lapsarian condition, the communication
of things’ takes place only in intermittent ‘flashes’ of the recognition of ‘nonsensuous similarity.” (Ross
83)
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once enjoyed in his communion with God.18 Man then imitates these forms, as in
horoscopes.19 However, the example of astrology also points to deterioration in modern
man’s capacity to recognize similarities: no longer do we see ourselves reflected back in
the stars. Rather, this faculty now appears to be reproduced in language and writing:
Recent graphology has taught us to recognize images, or more precisely picture
puzzles, in handwriting, pictures which conceal the writer’s unconscious. It can be
assumed that the mimetic faculty expressing itself in the activity of the writer was
of great importance for writing in the ancient times of its origin. Along with
language, writing has thus become an archive of non-sensuous similarities or nonsensuous correspondences. (Benjamin, “Doctrine” 68)
With naming as the original foundation of meaning, we have in nature a connection to the
meaning which makes true knowledge possible. Whereas man, after the Fall, initially
relies on intermittent “flashes” of recognition and mimesis of the similarities that nature
produces, Benjamin suggests that he has since interpolated that mimetic quality into
language—writing especially. Benjamin’s notion of linguistic meaning, recognized in
flashes which are then reproduced, as it were, mimetically in historiography. I return to
this below.
Regardless of the concealment of this inherited fullness by historicism and
progress, the past remains effectively available to the present. To know the present in its
inherited fullness is to see it as the angel of history does. As Benjamin asserts in his ninth
thesis:
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in
front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole
what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in
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“The linguistic nature of access to the ‘communication of matter’ is the pivot of Benjamin’s ‘doctrine’ of
similitude. In a sense, the perception of nonsensuous similarity recalls, or even sporadically captures, but
without being able to restore, the paradisiacal semantic plenitude of language” (Ross 82)
19

Benjamin writes that “the horoscope must be understood as an original totality which astrological
interpretation merely analyzed” (Benjamin, “Doctrine” 66)
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his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile
of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.
(Benjamin, Illuminations 257–58)
In this sense, the angel of history represents the objective practice of historiography—not
because historiography is divine, but because of the limited ways in which man has
access to knowledge of the present. Those who practice historiography must do so in
recognition of how meaning is constituted in order to ensure that they accurately name
the object, that is, recognize it in terms of its similarity and thus significance to the
present. In this way, the angel affirms the true historical object as that which Benjamin
describes in The Arcades Project: “An object of history is that through which knowledge
is constituted as the object’s rescue” (Benjamin, Arcades 476 [N11,4]). To recognize the
historical object is to represent it in language, whether in writing or orally, and thus to
have knowledge of its connection to the present, which is its redemption. Or, as Ross
explains, “Recognition and redemption of the historical object coincide” (Ross 113n5).
However, this particular excerpt also states that “The materialist presentation of history
carries along with it an immanent critique of the concept of progress” (Benjamin,
Arcades 476 [N11,4]). That is to say, recognition involves critique, an historicalmaterialist articulation, at which point the object is redeemed. Recognition intimately
connects mimesis, in the case of similitude, to the representation of historiography: “This,
if you will, magical side of both language and writing . . . is an intention with an
established basis which can only appear at all in connection with something alien, the
semiotic or communicative element of language” (Benjamin, “Doctrine” 68). In this
sense, historiographic representation can almost bring the historical object back to life
insofar as its articulation reveals the historicity of the present.
Theology uncovers the meaninglessness of the future, that is, as anything other
than a concept of that which can never be experienced. Benjamin alludes to this quality in
his twelfth thesis: “Social Democracy thought fit to assign to the working class the role of
the redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the sinews of its greatest strength.
This training made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, for
both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated

31

grandchildren” (Benjamin, Illuminations 260). Experience and thus action are limited to
the temporal and spatial coordinates of the present, whereas the material world and its
meaning are permanent. Thus, any meaningful emancipatory hope is passed down to the
present from the past. This conception also holds true for progress, which is experienced
in the present as a misrecognition of the historical object. Any revolutionary meaning
attributed to the future is an act of naming experienced in the present: an act which does
not name any “thing,” any part of God’s creation, and thus no “thing” that will ever exist.
In this way, Benjamin’s notion of historical knowledge resonates with Luxemburg’s
critique of the anarchist conception of the mass strike. Both place their revolutionary
hopes in a future that will never come. For associating the meaning of revolutionary
hopes with some future condition begins as a failure to properly name the experience of
class struggle and could never produce the sort of action necessary.
Thus, class struggle is emphatically an experience of the present, but in terms of
its historicity, of what makes it meaningful. Benjamin’s differentiation between the past
and history is instructive to this end:
Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various
moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It
became historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated
from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his point of departure
. . . grasps the constellation which his own era formed with a definite earlier one.
Thus he establishes a conception of the present as the ‘time of the now’ which is
shot through with chips of Messianic time. (Benjamin, Illuminations 263)
The past is, quite literally, past or previous presents, that is, the events which constitute
present experience. One event may indeed have a causal connection to a subsequent one,
but to consider this connection historical would be a mistake. The past becomes historical
only once its articulation integrates it into the historical narrative of the history of class
struggle. This is the narrative to which the proletarian seeks a resolution, the truth of
history: “Genuine historical knowledge has the character of an emphatic experience, a
flash of recognition, by which the knower enters into a ‘communion’ with the object of
knowledge, the dreaming past. In a sense, this understanding of truth is almost
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necessitated by Benjamin’s topic in all his works: experience” (Ross 50). To experience
the present in terms of historical truth carries consequences for one’s (re)actions:
The new, dialectical method of doing history presents itself as the art of
experiencing the present as waking world, a world to which that dream we name
the past refers in truth. To pass through and carry out what has been in
remembering the dream!—Therefore: remembering and awakening are most
intimately related. Awakening is namely the dialectical, Copernican turn of
remembrance. (Benjamin, Arcades 389 [K1,3])
Benjamin likens materialist historiography to the moment of awakening from dreamfilled sleep, during which the line between reality and dream is blurred. Even if the signs
of exploitation, oppression, and even emancipation are everywhere, they are not
immediately perceived as such. To awaken is to experience “what has been,” that is, the
present in terms of its relationship to the past, its historicity. This is the practice of
historiography: to pass through it and carry it out means to bring the practices of the
present into the light of their historicity. Ross explains that this articulation is Benjamin’s
attempt to collectivize the experience of historical knowledge: “this recognition of past
dreams is in fact an experience in the emphatic sense of this term, a ‘passing through and
carrying out what has been in remembering the dream.’ . . . the subject of such an
historical recognition is a ‘collective’” (Ross 49). Indeed, waking from the dream refers
to the various ways in which the past can be articulated to make the present meaningful.
Regardless, what one awakens to is inevitably the collective history of oppression and
exploitation.
Ross makes two criticisms of Benjamin’s theory of revolution which come down
to one misreading that can be used to further address the significance of the historical
articulation of the past to class struggle. She suggests that Benjamin’s collectivization of
historical knowledge through the dream metaphor “is not ‘transferable’ to the ‘collective’
as a subject of historical knowledge” (Ross 49). In regard to his insistence that class
struggle be articulated in terms of its historical significance, she objects that “There can
hardly be a more potent motivational basis for revolutionary struggle than the daily
experience of exploitation and oppression” (Ross 54). Considering the state of global
capitalism, obviously it is not. The problem here, however, is the notion of objectivity
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that underlies the second criticism in particular. To experience class struggle does not
guarantee an objective understanding of it. Regardless of the historiographic method
employed, the articulation of the past occurs “posthumously,” in a subsequent present. To
claim to articulate the past “the way it really was,” as historicism does, is not unlike
claims to objectivity in general, that is, the claim to be free from any ideology which
might cloud a “true,” “real,” or “accurate” representation. Yet, the claim to operate
outside ideology is about the most ideological claim one can make. Benjamin discusses
the ideology of this claim in the seventh thesis:
To historians who wish to relive an era, Fustel de Coulanges recommends that
they blot out everything they know about the later course of history. There is no
better way of characterizing the method with which historical materialism has
broken. It is a process of empathy whose origin is the indolence of the heart,
acedia, which despairs of grasping and holding the genuine historical image as it
flares up briefly. Among medieval theologians it was regarded as the root cause of
sadness . . . The nature of this sadness stands out more clearly if one asks with
whom the adherents of historicism actually empathize. The answer is inevitable:
with the victor. And all rulers are the heirs of those who conquered them.
(Benjamin, Illuminations 256)
This acedia is an ideological apathy toward and thus complicity with the present. For
historicism’s professed ignorance of the present is essentially an affirmation of that
present: “reliving” an era is an impossibility, but blotting out everything that follows a
moment in the past, its connection to the present of its articulation, implies that this
moment and its consequences are right and correct—an historical truth, merely by virtue
of their having happened. However, this is the nightmare in which class struggle,
motivated by the daily experience of exploitation and oppression, currently occurs.
Materialist historiography provides the indexes to wake up from this nightmare, which is
in many regards an individual experience—but it is the collective history of exploitation
and oppression that the individual awakens to. The experience of class struggle alone
does not provide the objective understanding that historical knowledge does. Only this
experience can provide the historical knowledge needed to inform effective political
action.
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In this way, historicism carries very real consequences for the present, perhaps
best exemplified by the ways in which the logic of historicism embraces the notion of
progress. The logical conclusion of historicism’s limiting historical truth to the past is
that all subsequent time is ontologically homogenous and empty:
Progress as pictured in the minds of Social Democrats was, first of all, the
progress of mankind itself (and not just advances in men’s ability and
knowledge). Secondly, it was something boundless, in keeping with the infinite
perfectibility of mankind. Thirdly, progress was regarded as irresistible,
something that automatically pursued a straight or spiral course. Each of these
predicates is controversial and open to criticism. However, when the chips are
down, criticism must penetrate beyond these predicates and focus on something
that they have in common. The concept of the historical progress of mankind
cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogenous,
empty time. (Benjamin, Illuminations 261)
The experience of the present specific to the temporality of progress has only two
features. The first is its homogeneity, a consequence of experience being articulated
solely in terms of the perfectibility of mankind. Insofar as this perfectibility provides the
only means or “indexes” by which to articulate or “refer” experience, time becomes
otherwise homogenous as everything else fades into the background of progress and
perfectibility. The second feature is time’s emptiness, a consequence of its homogeneity,
as the very continuance of time represents mankind’s successful completion of any past
tasks. Only progress or mankind’s perfectibility follows him into any subsequent present;
all else fades into this homogeneity.
Despite its ostensible disinterest in the past, progress entails a particular view of
history. In fact, this disinterest is tantamount to an ignorance that demands an alternative
view of history, one which recognizes the present’s consequential “state of emergency”
and produces the action necessary to contend with it: “We must attain to a conception of
history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task
to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle
against Fascism. One reason why Fascism has a chance is that in the name of progress its
opponents treat it as a historical norm” (Benjamin, Illuminations 257). Benjamin
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associates the rise of fascism with progress and its inadequate account of fascism as an
“historical norm.” For, as the continuation of historicism, progress assumes that any
experience of the present is wholly unencumbered by the past. The present moment’s
very existence is confirmation of mankind’s past triumph and continuation along the path
of perfectibility. This is the inadequacy of the progressivist view of history: it treats
historical phenomena as “norms,” tasks incumbent to mankind’s perfectibility. Past
atrocities belong to that past—their historical lesson has been learned.
For the historicist operating under the sign of progress, the presence of Fascism is
bewildering, but, as Benjamin argues, the confusion is really the historicist’s own: “The
current amazement that the things we are experience are ‘still’ possible in the twentieth
century. This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge—unless it is the knowledge
that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable” (Benjamin, Illuminations 257).
If fascism arises in the present, it is not simply “still” possible—it is exactly what the
present makes possible. Much like Luxemburg’s expositions of militarism and
imperialism, Benjamin’s various accounts of fascism tend to see it as a feature of
capitalist barbarism, although Benjamin considers fascism to be peculiar to the twentieth
century’s fetishization of technology: “It recognizes only the progress in the mastery of
nature, not the retrogression of society; it already displays the technocratic features later
encountered in Fascism” (Benjamin, Illuminations 259).20 Benjamin perceives a
continuum between progress, the fetishization of technology, and fascism. The capitalist
development of technology only seeks to foist some of the workers’ exploitation onto
machines, not revolutionize the mode of production itself. In this respect, fascism is
merely a feature or symptom of the current historical task, and the experience of the
present as the now reveals this fact. For to experience the present in terms of the now’s
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Benjamin makes a similar observation elsewhere: “Without approaching the surface of the significance
of the economic causes of war, one may say that the harshest, most disastrous aspects of imperialist war are
in part the result of the gaping discrepancy between the gigantic power of technology and the miniscule
moral illumination it affords. Indeed, according to its economic nature, bourgeois society cannot help but
insulate everything technological as much as possible from the so-called spiritual, and it cannot help but
resolutely exclude technology’s right of co-determination in the social order. Any future war will also be a
slave revolt of technology” (Benjamin, “Theories of German Fascism” 120).
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“presence” or “fullness” is to recognize it as always already in a state of emergency. This
articulation of experience inspires the action necessary to achieve “our task.”
Progress operates according to a temporal index by which it is referred not to
redemption but to mankind’s infinite perfectibility. Although fascism appears as an
aberration, it appears nonetheless and must be accounted for. The only critical (or
philosophical) knowledge that the amazement of this aberration can lead to is the
untenability of the progressivist view of history, its inadequacy. This is exactly where
Benjamin’s treatment of historicism and progress lead, a recognition of the inadequacy of
the progressivist view of history and of the necessity of materialist historiography’s
articulation of the present as “the now.” The temporal index of progress is mankind’s
infinite perfectibility, that is, the only mode of articulation for the events which comprise
present experience. Everything fades into the homogeneity of that index. That something
exists at all in the present means that it represents an aspect of man’s perfectibility, and
man (re)acts to the present accordingly. Thus, with the limited linguistic arsenal of
progress, fascism appears as an aberration, leading to the uncritical reaction, “how is this
‘still’ possible?” Fascism is thus accounted for as an historical norm, mistaken for the
task itself, when it is actually a symptom or feature of the task.
Written from 1920-21, the “Theologico-Political Fragment” is among one of
Benjamin’s earlier attempts to reconcile his bourgeoning political interests with the
theological underpinnings of his thought. Although the “Theses” represents a further
developed conception of materialist historiography’s theological aspects, the
correspondences between his thinking in the “Theologico-Political Fragment” and the
“Theses” are nonetheless useful for unpacking the terms in which Benjamin conceives of
political action. We find in the “Theologico-Political Fragment,” for example, an early
articulation of the link between political action and happiness: “The order of the profane
should be erected on the idea of happiness” (Benjamin, One-Way 155). Benjamin’s use of
happiness (in the second of his “Theses” and N13a,1 of the Arcades) is by no means an
arbitrary choice—not, for instance, a stylistic choice made for the way in which
happiness gestures to, as of yet, unimaginable conditions. Rather, happiness is, for
Benjamin, that which should motivate all political action, that is, all action in the profanehistorical realm, and this view is consistent from the “Theologico-Political Fragment” to
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his “Theses.” As he puts it in the earlier text, “The relation of this order to the Messianic
is one of the essential teachings of the philosophy of history. It is the precondition of a
mystical conception of history, containing a problem that can be represented figuratively”
(Benjamin, One-Way 155). That is to say, political action conceived of in terms of “this
order,” the idea of happiness, entails a view of history as unfolding to a particular end
that is neither the divine in and of itself nor wholly unlike the divine. Political action
motivated by this order conceives of the profane-historical realm in terms of a problem,
represented figuratively in the idea of happiness. No longer is political action stratified,
undertaken toward an endless multiplicity of goals, as theology reveals an endpoint that
the masses can pursue:
If one arrow points to the goal toward which the profane dynamic acts, and
another marks the direction of Messianic intensity, then certainly the quest of free
humanity for happiness runs counter to the Messianic direction; but just as a force
can, through acting, increase another that is acting in the opposite direction, so the
order of the profane assists, through being profane, the coming of the Messianic
Kingdom. The profane, therefore, although not itself a category of this Kingdom,
is a decisive category of its quietist approach. For in happiness all that is earthly
seeks its downfall, and only in good fortune is its downfall destined to find it.
Whereas, admittedly, the immediate Messianic intensity of the heart, of the inner
man in isolation, passes through misfortune, as suffering. To the spiritual
restitutio in integrum, which introduces immortality, corresponds a worldly
restitution that leads to the eternity of downfall, and the rhythm of this eternally
transient worldly existence, transient in its totality, in its spatial but also in its
temporal totality, the rhythm of Messianic nature, is happiness. For nature is
Messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away.
To strive after such passing, even for those stages of man that are nature,
is the task of world politics, whose method must be called nihilism. (Benjamin,
One-Way 155–56)
Benjamin concludes the “Theologico-Political Fragment” with an allusion to the
resurrection-deity motif in myth, in which a messianic figure passes and rises again from
the dead, often as a symbolic representation of seasonal passing from the death of winter
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to the new life of spring. Despite their necessarily nihilistic quality,21 world politics
operate according to a seasonal logic of nature’s passing from the death of oppression and
barbarism to the spring of new freedom.
The past is an upmost concern for Benjamin in the “Theses,” but that concern is
tempered by its significance for the present. Indeed, the only meaning Benjamin
considers to be available to the past is that which can be attributed to it in the present.
Benjamin refers to happiness in the present to illustrate this point: “our image of
happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption. The same applies to
our view of the past, which is the concern of history. The past carries with it a temporal
index by which it is referred to redemption” (Benjamin, Illuminations 254). As I suggest
above, happiness is, for Benjamin, the profane equivalent of messianic redemption. As an
expression of man’s desire for happiness, mechanization represents for Benjamin an
historical tendency not unlike that which Marx recognizes in his “Fragment.” What limits
the attainment of this wish, the full expression of machines’ potential, is its capitalistic
articulation. Happiness is also a theological corollary for man’s innate desire to be free:
[T]he realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is in fact
determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases . . . [Man must
wrestle with nature] in all social formations and under all possible modes of
production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a
result of his wants; but, at the same time the forces of production which satisfy
these wants also increase. (Marx, Capital: Vol. 3 807)
For Benjamin, the nineteenth century’s explosion of innovation most strongly expresses
the collective desire for happiness, which occupies much of Benjamin’s attention in the
Arcades: “the industrial and technological innovations of the nineteenth century make it
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Benjamin opens the “Theologico-Political Fragment” with a rejection of theocracy: “the order of the
profane cannot be built up on the idea of the Divine Kingdom, and therefore theocracy has no political but
only religious meaning. To have repudiated with utmost vehemence the political significance of theocracy
is the cardinal merit of Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia” (Benjamin, One-Way 155). Any attempt to bring the
divine into the profane, to install a theocracy within the profane, is meaningless: “Only the Messiah himself
consummates all history, in the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the
Messianic” (Benjamin, One-Way 155). At no point, in either the “Theologico-Political Fragment” or the
“Theses,” does Benjamin afford messianic power to any profane figure—only a weak messianic power, at
best.
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possible to articulate the human wish for happiness in concrete terms that gives this
century its exceptional significance . . . the nineteenth century makes human happiness a
meaningful concept for historical agents because it makes the constituent elements of
such a ‘wish’ describable” (Ross 81). In this sense, the advent of mechanization
represents, for Benjamin, the same historical tendency toward communism as it does for
Marx in the “Fragment.” The Arcades contains a counterpart or, perhaps, earlier draft of
the second thesis:
Happiness for us is unthinkable only in the air that we have breathed, among the
people who have lived with us. In other words, there vibrates in the idea of
happiness (this is what that noteworthy circumstance teaches us) the idea of
salvation. This happiness is founded on the very despair and desolation which
were ours. Our life, it can be said, is a muscle strong enough to contract the whole
of historical time. Or, to put it differently, the genuine conception of historical
time rests entirely upon the image of redemption. (Benjamin, Arcades 479
[N13a,1])
Notably, the object of “the idea of salvation” and “the image of redemption” is Erlösung
or “redemption” in the original German (Benjamin, GS 600 [N13a,1]). Ross translates
both instances as “redemption” and writes the following: “Our sense of fulfilment
depends on the remembrance and ‘redemption’ [Erlösung] of past disappointments,
which is also a ‘release’ [Erlösung] from the past. This remains a possibility for the
personal past of the living; and it must remain a possibility for the dead, the redemption
of whose ‘disconsolateness and desertedness’ fulfils the ‘historical time’” (Ross 100).
Benjamin’s seventh and eighth theses can be read together in order to further
explicate the qualities of the alternative temporality of the present he constructs in
opposition to the constellation of historicism: “Whoever has emerged victorious
participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over
those who are lying prostrate” (Benjamin, Illuminations 256). These, the prostrate
defeated of the seventh thesis, animate the “tradition of the oppressed” in the eighth. The
method of materialist historiography thus stands in opposition to historicism’s method of
complicity:
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[E]mpathy with the victor invariably benefits the rulers. Historical materialists
know what that means. Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in
the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying
prostrate. According to traditional practice, the spoils are carried along in the
procession. They are called cultural treasures, and a historical materialist views
them with cautious detachment. For without exception the cultural treasures he
surveys have an origin which he cannot contemplate without horror. They owe
their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have
created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries. There is no
document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.
And just as such a document of barbarism is not free of barbarism, barbarism
taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A
historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He
regards it as his task to brush against the grain of history. (Benjamin,
Illuminations 256–57).
The historical materialist’s “cautious detachment” suggests an objective attitude toward
historical phenomena. For Benjamin, the temporal logic of materialist historiography is
not merely preferable—it is premised on what he takes to be the objective standard for
analysing historical phenomena, responding directly to progressivism’s inadequate
account of present phenomena such as fascism. Benjamin discusses a strikingly similar
methodology in Convolute N of his Arcades Project: “Modest methodological proposal
for the cultural-historical dialectic. It is very easy to establish oppositions, according to
determinate points of view, within the various ‘fields’ of any epoch, such that on one side
lies the ‘productive,’ ‘forward-looking,’ ‘lively,’ ‘positive’ part of the epoch, and on the
other side the abortive, retrograde, and obsolescent” (Benjamin, Arcades 459 [N1a,3]).
The seventh thesis deploys a method not unlike this cultural-historical dialectic that
reveals historicism’s pursuit of the easy methodological route, establishing oppositions
between the historical truth which presents itself as “lively,” that which is “productive”
insofar as it produces that truth, and relegates the rest to the detritus of the past. In this
way, however, historicism betrays its methodological inadequacy: “The very contours of
the positive element will appear distinctly only insofar as this element is set off against
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the negative” (Benjamin, Arcades 459 [N1a,3]). That is to say, the “negated” oppressed
imbue the “positive” victory of the rulers with meaning—the rulers owe their position to
their triumph over and oppression of the defeated. What this betrays is the continued
relevance of the past to the present, as it remains effectively available in this present, that
is, materially as the “cultural treasures,” although their negative aspect only has meaning
insofar as it affirms or “sets off” the positive, to the benefit of present rulers. The
inadequacy of historicism and, by extension, progress is not the phenomena they
articulate; rather, it is their methodology, which constitutes a sort of lie by omission.
Materialist historiography corrects this, and it does so by its objective treatment of the
negative:
It is therefore of decisive importance that a new partition be applied to this
initially excluded, negative component so that, by a displacement of the angle of
vision (but of the criteria!), a positive element emerges anew in it too—something
different from that previously signified. And so on, ad infinitum, until the entire
past is brought into the present in a historical apocatastasis.22 (Benjamin, Arcades
459 [N1a,3])
Much as, for Marx, capitalism’s contradictions, grounded in its pursuit of surplus value,
point to a future alternative social order, the documents of civilization’s barbaric subtext
provide the historical materialist with the criteria for action in the present. This method
brushes against the grain of history, bringing long lost meanings springing to the surface,
not unlike how a change in perspective shines light on what once was hidden.

2.2 Redemption and Revolution: Rosa Luxemburg and the
Historical Articulation of the Past
This section argues that Luxemburg’s notion of spontaneity represents what
Benjamin would consider the historical articulation of the past—that her discussion of,
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Rolf Tiedemann defines apocatastasis as the “‘Restoration of all things.’ Derived from Jewish
apocalyptic, Stoic, and Neoplatonic-Gnostic traditions, the concept originally referred to the recurrence of a
specific planetary constellation” (Tiedemann 989n3).
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for example, the mass strike “seize[s] hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of
danger” (Benjamin, Illuminations 255). This memory is that of class struggle, for which
the mass strike is “the indication . . . of a whole period of class struggle lasting for years,
perhaps for decades” (Luxemburg 263). That is to say, Luxemburg recognizes in the
mass strike an abbreviation of the history of class struggle: “The present, which, as a
model of Messianic time, comprises the entire history of mankind in an enormous
abridgement, coincides exactly with the stature which the history of mankind has in the
universe” (Benjamin, Illuminations 263).
There is a broad correspondence between Benjamin’s treatment of the relationship
between the profane political and the divine and Luxemburg’s notion of the absolute
reciprocity between the political and the economic. Whereas happiness is, for Benjamin,
the note by which the profane can harmonize itself with the divine, freedom would
constitute the ultimate goal for Luxemburg. In this case, Luxemburg’s “divine” would be
the lived experience of socialism realized fully in history. Put simply, for Luxemburg, the
political and economic ultimately belong entirely to the political, within the constellation
of what Benjamin terms the profane (the earthly-historical-political). In her view, the
economic organization of human relations structures the political (human relations): a
mode of production determines social relations.23 In this context, class struggle under
capitalism is the long process through which the dominated battle to transform those
social relations; the forms of this battle include the possibility of revolutionary rupture
and the destruction of the state and political forms of domination. This conception of
class struggle and political action corresponds to Benjamin’s understanding of the
relationship between political action in the profane and messianic redemption. This
relationship refers to the way in which happiness, as a political goal, can bring the
profane into a sort of accord with the divine: the profane would not become divine,

23

Tony Smith identifies this process in Marx’s Grundrisse as “form determination,” or “the manner in
which the options, subjective preferences, and external behaviour of human agents are shaped by [relations
among] things as a result of the social form they possess in generalised commodity production. Due to
these social forms, money and capital are not so much instruments of social life as embodiments of sociality
standing over and against individual human subjects” (Smith 246).
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something only the messiah can accomplish.24 It could, however, exist at spatial and
temporal coordinates which are simultaneous to the divine.25 As I suggest above,
Benjamin’s discussion of man’s pursuit of happiness correlates to the notion of freedom
that Marx and Luxemburg see as innate to mankind. The link with Luxemburg would
then be found in the way that class struggle, under the guidance of scientific socialism,
should lead to a realm of complete emancipation and cooperation, a realm of happiness.
In order to further understand how spontaneity constitutes an historical
articulation of the past, I want to turn briefly to the correspondences between Jacques
Derrida’s Specters and Benjamin’s “Theses,” which Derrida himself notes, particularly
with respect to his notion of injunction and Benjamin’s notion of the past’s claim to the
present.26 Derrida describes this “injunction” as follows: “To feel ourselves seen by a
look which it will always be impossible to cross, that is the visor effect on the basis of
which we inherit the law. Since we do not see the one who sees us, and who makes the
law, who delivers the injunction . . ., since we do not see the one who orders ‘swear,’ we
cannot identify it in all certainty, we must fall back on its voice” (Derrida 7). Thus,
history has a similar status for Derrida as Benjamin: one cannot reach out and touch
history, which happens in contingent events but appears in mediated textualized forms.
These forms extend to the whole of social relations: “one cannot speak of generations of
skulls or spirits . . . except on the condition of language—and the voice, in any case of
that which marks the name or takes its place. (‘Hamlet: That Scull had a tongue in it, and
could sing once’)” (Derrida 9). Benjamin’s expression, the “documents of barbarism,”
represents a similar idea insofar as their status as “cultural treasures” is a tacit acceptance
of the exploitation and oppression they represent. These are the various histories which
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“Only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in the sense that he alone redeems, completes,
creates its relation to the Messianic” (Benjamin, One-Way 155).
25

“For in happiness all that is earthly seeks its downfall . . . To the spiritual restitutio in integrum . . .
corresponds a worldly restitution that leads to the eternity of downfall, and the rhythm of this eternally
transient worldly existence, transient in its totality, in its spatial but also in its temporal totality, the rhythm
of Messianic nature is nature, is happiness” (Benjamin, One-Way 155–56).
26

See Derrida, Specters of Marx, 228-29n2.
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constitute the present, and which may very well lie dormant. Their condition is that of
language: “The Scull [which] could sing once” gestures to the contingency of any
historical articulation—the chance that any historical object may one day be a “cultural
treasure,” its very meaning thus sterilized.
Derrida refers to history, in this regard, as “this thing that is called spirit” (Derrida
4) or “this Thing that is not a thing” (Derrida 6). These quotes refer to history’s
phenomenological and linguistic status in a sense that two lines from Marx’s Communist
Manifesto, which are integral to Specters, can help us to further explicate: “A spectre is
haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism” (Marx, Karl Marx 245); and “The history
of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx, Karl Marx 246). If
the spirit of history, that which joins its seemingly disparate events but disjoins its
experience, is class struggle, then its specter, its manifestations in “flesh and
phenomenality,” is in the desire for an alternative social order, for communism:
As soon as one no longer distinguishes spirit from specter, the former assumes a
body, it incarnates itself, as spirit, in the specter. Or rather, as Marx himself spells
out, . . . the specter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain
phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. It becomes, rather, some “thing” that
remains difficult to name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other. For it
is flesh and phenomenality that give to the spirit its spectral apparition, but which
disappear right away in its apparition, in the very coming of the revenant or the
return of the specter. (Derrida 4–5)
History is at all times mediated by interpretation and articulation, but that is not to say
that the mere articulation of the past constitutes history. Those articulations of the past
which are in fact historical reveal three things, the constituents of history, one of which is
the “skulls and spirits” discussed above. Another characterizes the practice of
historiography as a form of mourning: “It consists always in attempting to ontologize
remains, to make them present, in the first place by identifying the bodily remains and by
localizing the dead” (Derrida 9). In this sense, according to Derrida, Marx mourns
communism (identifies and locates its remains) in the “Fragment” by identifying it within
the productive capacity of mechanization and localizing the dead in capitalism’s
contradictory organization of social relations around the extraction of surplus value: “The
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more this contradiction develops, the more does it become evident that the growth of the
forces of production can no longer be bound up with the appropriation of alien labour, but
that the mass of workers must themselves appropriate their own surplus labour” (Marx,
Grundrisse 708). Furthermore, mourning expresses the same quality that Benjamin
attributes to language and writing: that is, to make the present historically meaningful. In
one sense, mourning reveals the fullness of the present, what Benjamin calls “the now,”
and resonates with his theology of the divine and profane. For the fragmented, historical
profane is the antipode of the complete, permanent divine. Although the profane will
always be historical, it can bring itself into line with the divine by way of happiness,
repairing to some extent its fragmentary state. The present, in other words, contains
within in it the remnants of an alternative social order, which the nineteenth century’s
expression of man’s wish for happiness seems to confirm.
Luxemburg recognizes this quality of the present in her insistence on the absolute
reciprocity between the economic and the political. She articulates this reciprocity in
terms of the merger debate, in the eighth and final section of “The Mass Strike,” “Need
for United Action of Trade Unions and Social Democracy”: “the German trade unions are
a direct product of social democracy” (Luxemburg 304). That is to say, the merger debate
must be premised on the understanding that social democracy’s expression of the political
struggle and the trade unions’ expression of the economic struggle are always already
merged insofar as they are both contingent on history, which is at all times the history of
class struggle: “the separation of the political and the economic struggle and the
independence of each is nothing but an artificial product of the parliamentarian period,
even if historically determined” (Luxemburg 299). So long as one accepts the precepts of
historical materialism, then one must understand that history, its spirit, is the long process
of class struggle. As the expression of the economic and thus base of social relations, and
the place where workers ostensibly experience class struggle, the trade-union struggle
might be thought of as the absolute foundation and thus primary form of class struggle.
However, just as we cannot touch history, trade unions cannot be incarnations of history.
Rather, the nature of these remains must be understood within the historical context of
class struggle, for which trade unions are a spectral expression, the “flesh and
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phenomenality” of communism, the fragments of which Marx and Benjamin locate in
mechanization.
Luxemburg’s notion of spontaneity recognizes in such forms of political action an
abbreviation of history that speaks to the way in which world politics pursues an end
which is not unlike while also absolutely not divine. For the profane redemption of
revolution seeks to realize the meaning its fragments have been imbued with by God. As
expressed through redemption and mourning, historiography proves productive: “the
thing works, whether it transforms or transforms itself, poses or decomposes itself: the
spirit, the ‘spirit of the spirit’ is work. But what is work? What is its concept if it supposes
the spirit of the spirit? Valéry underscores it: ‘By ‘Spirit’ here I mean a certain power of
transformation the spirit works’” (Derrida 9). Luxemburg recognizes this
transformational power in the spontaneity of the masses:
[T]his first general direct action reacted inwardly all the more powerfully as it for
the first time awoke class feeling and class consciousness in millions upon
millions as if by an electric shock. And this awakening of class feeling expressed
itself forthwith in the circumstances that the proletarian mass, counted by
millions, quite suddenly and sharply came to realize how intolerable was that
social and economic existence which they had patiently endured for decades in
the chains of capitalism. Thereupon there began a spontaneous general shaking of
and tugging at these chains. All the innumerable sufferings of the modern
proletariat reminded them of the old bleeding wounds. Here was the eight-hour
day fought for, there piecework was resisted, here were brutal foremen ‘driven
off. (Luxemburg 248)
Luxemburg’s reference to the realization of class consciousness, as if by an electric
shock, is highly reminiscent of Benjamin’s language, which Alex Levant notes: “These
experiences of a sudden flash of memory are, according to Benjamin, unconscious
memory traces that have been triggered by something in the present” (Levant 381). This
something is the fragments of an alternative social order, which already exists within the
present—not production itself, but its capitalistic expression. Historiography is thus
productive insofar as it effects a change in perspective, so that capitalist social relations,
and not their features, are seen as “intolerable”: “by a displacement of the angle of vision
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(but not of the criteria!), a positive element emerges anew in it too—something different
from the previously signified. And so on, ad infinitum, until the entire past is brought into
the present in a historical apocatastasis” (Benjamin, Arcades 459 [N1a,3]). Luxemburg’s
final lines in “The Mass Strike” indicate that it is in this sense of bringing the past fully
into the present that she envisions socialism’s realization: “The trade-union movement is
. . . that which lives in the consciousness of the mass of proletarians who have been won
for the class struggle. In this consciousness the trade-union movement is a part of social
democracy. ‘And what it is, that should it dare to appear’” (Luxemburg 315).
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Chapter 3

3

The Incommensurability of History in Alfred Döblin’s
November 1918
This chapter considers the narrative figuration of collective action as a search for

justice in the second volume of Alfred Döblin’s November 1918 tetralogy.27 This volume
consists of two parts, 28 A People Betrayed and The Troops Return, and represents the
period from November 22, 1918, shortly after the beginning of the November
Revolution’s second stage in Germany, to December 14, 1918—although the final book
reaches into the 1920s and depicts events which are largely international. These
narratives represent a period which informs much of Walter Benjamin’s early work and
which ends only weeks before the assassination of Rosa Luxemburg, who appears
throughout the second volume and again as the protagonist of the third. But whereas
Luxemburg’s and Benjamin’s theories identify a weak messianic impulse throughout
history that expresses man’s desire for emancipation and seems to inspire organization
and collective action, Döblin’s novel sees only centuries of irredeemable conflict.
Perhaps due in part to Döblin’s conversion to Catholicism during World War II, his novel
raises the question of history’s commensurability: even if the history of all hitherto
existing society were the history of class struggle, do men, the makers of history, have the
capacity to grasp and act on that history’s full magnitude on a global scale in order to
realize a justice that would not simply collapse as so many regimes before it?

27

November 1918 is in fact a tetralogy organized into three volumes, with the second volume consisting of
two parts. This situation is due largely to the novel’s unusual publication history, ending with the
authoritative German edition’s division of the work into three parts (Kiesel 215-16, 231n1). The English
translation follows this convention: the first volume, Bürger und Soldaten has never been translated into
English; the second volume consists of two parts, Verratenes Volk and Heimkehr der Fronttruppen,
published in English as A People Betrayed and The Troops Return, respectively; and the third, Karl und
Rosa, was published in English as Karl and Rosa.
28

I use the following terminology to describe the second volume’s organization: the volume itself is split
into two parts, A People Betrayed and The Troops Return, which are made up of several books, all but the
last of which are titled by the date depicted; these books are then divided into chapters, which are divided
into sections.
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Dates are central to the organization of A People Betrayed and The Troops
Return, and this emphasis on dates would seem simply to illustrate Döblin’s thoughts on
honest historiography: “‘If we look at the writing of history, we see that only chronology
is honest. Once dates are ordered the manoeuvre begins. To put it bluntly: one makes use
of history’” (Döblin qtd. in Lukács 274).29 This constitutes, for Döblin, the dilemma of
the historical novel: if anything beyond chronology is interpretation, or the use of history
to advance a particular argument or vision of history, how does one accurately represent
history? The dilemma also complicates whether November 1918, a novel which
chronicles as much as comments on history, is in fact an historical novel. The tetralogy’s
title—the month and name of the socialist revolution that created the Weimar republic
and preceded the failed Spartacist revolution of January 1918—signals the work’s
historical intent, particularly in the second volume: the narrator as chronicler registers
persons and events in books titled according to the dates they depict, evidence of the
novel’s effort at historical accuracy. Significantly, however, this practice ends with the
second volume’s final book, “Last Echoes, the Sequel” (and does not resume in the third
volume, Karl and Rosa). Thus, The Troops Return seems to diverge from the honesty of
chronology, from what Döblin considers the conventions of the historical novel, and
venture into the interpretation of history. As Klaus Hofmann observes,
The narrator poses as the indifferent and disinterested onlooker, registering what
happens—or, rather, pointing at representations of what happened— . . . notably
so in the chapter and section headings and in the summaries given at the head of
the chapters in Book II. The pose is part of the alienation strategy which subverts
the novel’s realism into irony and occasionally ventures into surrealist episodes,
which the narrator reports as matter-of-factly as anything else. (Hofmann,
“Transcending the Historical Novel” 319)

29

See Bance 298n2 and Hofmann, “Revolution and Redemption” 472, who both attribute this argument to
Döblin’s essay “Der historische Roman und wir” (“The Historical Novel and Us”), which does not seem to
be available in English.
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Both chronicler and adjudicator of history,30 the narrator complicates the novel’s form.
Hofmann asks “whether this novel can be contained within or in fact transgresses the
confines of [the historical novel]” (Hofmann, “Transcending the Historical Novel” 309).
However, he seems to answer this question in an earlier article, in which he claims that
the narrator’s methods “are stylistic moves which do not deny the narrator’s obligation to
a presumed reality” (Hofmann, “Revolution and Redemption” 472). That presumed
reality is the contingency of history, and November 1918 is by no means ignorant of
history—it is, if anything, painfully aware of history and its practical failure to deliver a
successful, thoroughgoing social revolution.
In November 1918, the dilemma of the historical novel becomes the dilemma of
history itself, or, more precisely, the dilemma of history as repetition or as a continuum in
which a litany of revolutions inevitably leads back to the oppression and exploitation that
inspired them. The question of history’s accurate representation turns to whether it is
reasonable to expect history to resolve itself. Karl Marx articulates the problem in “The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” as follows: “The tradition of the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living. And, just when they
appear to be engaged in the revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material
surroundings, in the creation of something which does not yet exist, precisely in such
epochs of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up spirits of the past to help them”
(Marx, “Eighteenth Brumaire” 146). But where Marx sees an historical logic, for the
narrator of November 1918, history is chaos:
[H]e refrains from endowing history with logical coherence. Standing Aristotle’s
ruling on its head, the narrator of November 1918 claims to be more faithful to a
given reality than historians, who, along with some narrators, construct a world of
logical consistency, while he takes nature to be much more wanton . . . working
through lack of reason as well as through over-determination. (Hofmann,
“Revolution and Redemption” 472)

30

See Hofmann, “Revolution and Redemption” 472.
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The honesty of chronology demonstrates the disorder of history, ironically: if history has
a logic, it is imperceptible to those who must make it from deep within its confused and
rapid unfolding. Whatever correlations or connections men claim to find can be attributed
to man’s faculty for finding patterns—where none necessarily exist. This faculty might
help survival of the day-to-day, but its capacities are exceeded when applied to anything
beyond an individual’s lifespan.
Thus, A People Betrayed and The Troops Return are a disavowal of history, its
capacity to resolve itself, its having any discernable, practical logic, and the narrator
articulates this disavowal in temporal terms not unlike Jacques Derrida’s notion of
temporal disjunction: “Time vomited what was in its belly. It remained to be seen
whether that would make it well again” (Döblin 77). This remark must be understood on
a literal and figurative level. As it opens the chapter section “The Retreat of the Defeated
Army,” time’s ejection is the literal return of the German army—the troops’ return from
the warfront, defeated:
While Wermuth, the mayor of Berlin, was calling on the city to receive its troops
with ceremony—“shadows lie over the German nation, but above them all shines
its eternal glory. Lift up your hearts to greet Germany’s sons, bind for them
wreaths of honor to deck the railroads, houses and streets, quarter them in your
homes”—the British cavalry was marching into Namur and Liège.
Belgian troops moved toward Cologne, French divisions toward Mainz.
The vanguard of the English troops was led by General Harbringer. When he
entered Charleroi, driving German regiments before him, they had just left the
city, blowing up fifty munition cars before their departure. Civilians were killed.
As they marched out, the Germans were attacked by hostile citizenry. Belgian
police had to intervene. (Döblin 77)
Figuratively, time vomits that which remains unresolved from World War I as it passes
into the November Revolution: The Council of the People’s Deputies, an interim
government, has replaced the monarchy, signalling an end, but to what—to the entire
November Revolution or only its first phase? Rather than any actual historical figure,
General Harbringer seems to be literally a harbinger, signalling the approach of the
answer to that question. For, despite the novel’s fragmented narrative, the troops’ return
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looms large throughout, signifying the crushing reality of sacrifices made for those who
sacrifice nothing and the aftermath of Germany’s loss, the brunt of which would be borne
by the already starving masses. Class struggle, in other words, continues, but to what
end?
To understand this question, we must acknowledge the complexity of what
remains unresolved: the troops’ return does not simply signify an experience of
oppression and exploitation over which the masses of all countries could easily unite. It
also carries nationalist undertones: mourning Germany’s defeat, while celebrating the
return of “Germany’s sons.” The narrator alludes to the contradictory symbolism of the
troops’ return when the event finally occurs in the second part of volume two:
The tension grew. People thought they heard a distant beat of drums. A wave of
shouts rolled along the streets. The guards formed a chain to hold back the
masses. And now trumpets were indeed approaching.
And then began the spectacle that caused many in the crowd to weep. Men
as well as women, moved by the emotion of man’s common fate, remembering
the long war and all the dead.
Did these people see the troops? They were looking at the long war, at
victories and defeats. Passing before them was a piece of their own life, with
wagons and horses, machine guns and cannons.
An unending hurrah burst about the parade. The children waved their
flags. People waved from windows and balconies with handkerchiefs. The officer
and the rank and file had attached their lilies of the valley to their chests, many
wore the Iron Cross, all had on black, white and red rosettes and ribbons. (Döblin
409-10)
Mentions of black, white, and red, the colours of imperialist Germany, allude to the
competing history of the country’s national colours. These colours’ association with
imperialist Germany renders them a symbol of the country’s internal unrest—the
historical burden of imperialist Germany which still weighed “like a nightmare” on the
new German republic, and which would not suddenly disappear with the advent of the
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republic.31 When the narrator asks whether “these people see the troops,” he asks how
they conceive of that defeat, how they interpret history: as the transnational experience of
all men, forced to fight in long wars, which could be experienced just as easily at the
level of the bereaved individual, suddenly faced with the reminder of a lost loved one; or,
as a nationalist experience, bitter over Germany’s defeat, which the Kaiser’s forced
abdication makes doubly painful? The narrator would respond that the interpretation
differs from one person to the next and occurs on a spectrum.
This indeterminacy suggests that A People Betrayed and The Troops Return
constitute a liminal novel, both historical and, as Hofmann suggests of the entire
tetralogy, polemical: “in accordance with Döblin’s dictum: ‘Mit Geschichte will man
etwas’ [with history you want something]” (Hofmann, “Revolution and Redemption”
473). The narrator’s indiscriminate criticisms evince the position and logic of this
polemic: that history is incommensurable not because there is no standard for the
judgement of history, but because man is unable to effectively perceive and practice the
standard by which history is to be judged, if that judgement were to be just. The position
appears throughout the novel as the search for a “justice” that will guarantee “a lasting
peace.” Georges Clemenceau, the prime minster of France during WWI, offers an
instructive account of justice in this regard:
“Justice is an organization of historical forces, which time to time call for
strengthening.” And there you have it. That is Europe: historical forces that from
time to time grow weaker and then have to be strengthened. Everything fine and
dandy—except that true justice is missing. Everything at the moment depends on
the victor’s showing that he knows what justice is, what absolute justice is, and
acknowledging it. He must begin with trust. Victory has placed that duty upon
him. He can only expect bitterness, hate and a thirst for revenge from the
defeated. (Döblin 613)
This justice, historical justice, is fragmentary and incommensurable, in the sense
suggested in the previous chapter’s discussion of “the generations of skulls or spirits”
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(Derrida 9). As this thing that is not a thing, history can only be perceived and conceived
of “on the condition of language” (Derrida 9), in the mediated textualized forms which
articulate historical events. Thus, the standards of historical justice are formulated in
direct response to the way in which these forms chronicle fragments of history—not
history in and of itself. Thus, justice for history would apply to the whole of history and
need to be “absolute” or “true.” Anything less would be historical and yet another
deferral of justice, as the victor lies in wait of the reprisal that satisfies the other’s
bitterness, hate, and thirst, however temporarily.
The question remains, however: what is this “absolute” or “true” justice? Derrida
discusses such a concept in terms which are highly compatible with November 1918. This
is the concept of justice he develops in his analysis of Heidegger’s criticism of the
translation of the ancient Greek term Dikē as justice (as well as right or penalty):
“Heidegger . . . interprets Dikē as joining, adjoining, adjustment, articulation of accord or
harmony on the basis of presence . . . Dikē harmoniously conjoins, in some way, the
joining and the accord. Adikia to the contrary: it is at once what is disjointed, undone,
twisted and out of line, in the wrong of the injust, or even in the error of stupidity”
(Derrida 27). Heidegger takes issue with the modern “juridical-moral” connotations of
this translation, which fail to capture the particular historicity of the term. As Derrida
explains, Heidegger instead proposes an understanding of Dikē based on being as
presence, which Derrida’s discussion of Hamlet can help us to understand: “Hamlet is
‘out of joint’ because he curses his own mission, the punishment that consists in having
to punish, avenge, exercise justice and right in the form of reprisals; and what he curses
in his mission is this expiation of expiation itself” (Derrida 23). That is to say, Hamlet
does not curse the expiation of his father’s death but his experience of the present, the
“presence” of which is a temporal disjointedness experienced as the present’s demand for
that expiation: it is the first and last standard by which the entirety of his experience of
the present is judged. Thus, for Hamlet, to balance this particular present, to make this
and only this present just, is to satisfy the demand of his father’s specter—to avenge his
death by killing Claudius. In a passage which could serve equally well as a definition of
historical justice, Derrida argues that this justice would be “the jointure of the accord: the
proper jointure to the other given by one who does not have it. Injustice would be the

55

disjointure or disjoining” (Derrida 31–32). It is no justice at all (and exactly the sort of
justice November 1918 is critical of): one that is so contingent, it ceases to be just the
moment its standards are satisfied, effectively disjoining any subsequent present, as when
Gertrude, Laertes, and Hamlet all must die in order that Claudius might be killed and the
king’s death avenged—fully, four deaths to avenge one. This is the justice which
November 1918 observes throughout history, justice as history’s repeated demands for
expiation, which suggests the incommensurability of history.
The alternative justice Derrida proposes is “justice as relation to the other,” and its
response to the presence of disjunction is to risk “the evil, expropriation, injustice
(Adikia) against which there is no calculable insurance” (Derrida 32). This is justice
given as a gift, freely and without expectation, whether that be of reciprocation of future
payment. Much as the gift given with expectation is no gift at all, justice given on those
terms entails the disjunction of the present, over which the expectation hangs; it is justice
not as the gift exchanged with the other, but given to the other, in relation to the other, “to
what must . . . be rendered to the singularity of the other, to his or her absolute
precedence or to his or her absolute previousness, to the heterogeneity of a pre-, which,
to be sure, means what comes before me, before any present, thus before any past
present, but also what, for that very reason comes from the future or as future: as the
coming of the event” (Derrida 33). Not unlike Walter Benjamin’s notion of “the now,”32
justice as relation to the other is given in light of the present and everything in
“precedence” to it, everything which “preceded” it in order to make it, and thus
everything which would preclude historical justice. And if it is given with anything, it is
with intention, which seems to convey its futurity: this present may be disjointed, but the
gift of justice is given in response to that “presence” and with the intention of
harmonizing it, an event realized in the subsequent present, future to that of the gifting,
and, in this way, the coming of that long-deferred, “absolute” or “true” justice.
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This language of a justice “to come” alludes to its messianic undertones,33 which
Derrida describes as “the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity
of the arrivant as justice” (Derrida 33). The historical messiah arrives as the other whose
enactment of justice constitutes the singularity of the arrivant as justice, the realization of
that event which is first and last. For A People Betrayed and The Troops Return, the logic
of a justice to come is appropriate for the divine messiah, who comes as singularity: the
divine messiah’s very coming is the fulfillment of his promise, just as Christ comes as the
Son who is the singularity of God in the Trinity.34 The historical messiah, by contrast, is
always preceded by a plurality that depends on reciprocation to constitute the singularity
of the messianic event. This is the truth of history, to which the novel returns: the
fragmentation and thus incommensurability of history. Friedrich Becker notes the
following immediately before the denouement of his search for justice, which suggests
that its realization amounts to a truth:
“The secret of heaven—is it not our duty to become as gods. Can we stop even
there? The world exists not only in the images with which we do battle daily.
There are other images besides, I can sense them, I feel the ecstasy even now just
thinking about them. It all blossoms as if from a tree . . . Why not heavenly
images, in fullest majesty?” . . .
“The world has a place in the order of justice, but it is also bound up with
that majesty . . . is it wrong for me to feel—that we and this world must die in
order to live in God?” (Döblin 597).
Whatever justice there is available within the historical is to be accessed through divine
images that transcend the fragmentation of the historical, and that the believer “senses” or
“feels” these images as a matter of faith. Thus, what the believer experiences in faith is
absolute justice but, much as happiness is for Benjamin the profane equivalent of a divine
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experience, not in its fullness: absolute meaning is only available through the divine, to
which the believer has fragmented access in faith and full access after death. By
extension, the only truth available to the historical is its divine negation: that history is
fragmented by virtue of its being the antipode to the divine’s permanence. That is to say,
for A People Betrayed and The Troops Return, historical truth is not necessarily
fragmented, but it is ascertained much as a bat uses echolocation to navigate by where it
is not.
If the divine messiah comes as a pre-existing singularity, the historical messiah’s
coming is fragmented into two events: his coming with the intention to create a
singularity that renders his arrival the first and the last, “the arrivant as justice,” and his
coming to render that gift of justice without expectation. The event which comes as the
historical messiah to fulfill the temporal disjunction of A People Betrayed is the actual
event of the troops’ return, and its success depends on whether man can render the events
time vomited digestible. The narrator offers the following commentary on the event in the
chapter’s epigraph: “December 10th. When the troops march through the Brandenburg
Gate, they seem to be both the present and the future. The farther they move into the city
the older they grow, and finally they become completely unreal” (Döblin 409). The
soldiers occupy a liminal temporality: returning to the present as the defeated past whose
presence is history’s demand for justice. And if, as Derrida suggests, absolute justice
“comes from the future or as future” (Derrida 33), the troops’ return comes as future, as
the possibility of the only temporality in which the soldiers’ demand could be resolved:
they do not come as a singular temporality, but as the past whose presence gestures to the
future. Thus, the soldiers’ futurity is fitting from a theological standpoint. As I suggested
in the previous chapter, the future is a meaningless temporality, that is, as anything other
than a concept of that which can never be experienced: any meaning attributed to the
future is an act of naming experienced in the present, an act which does not name any
“thing,” any part of God’s creation, and thus no “thing” that will ever exist.35 In A People
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Betrayed and The Troops Return, however, the future is meaningless because it refers to a
time without “presence,” to a present which could never be insofar as the fragmentation
of history is experienced in the present as the presence of a Dikē which ought to be. Thus,
the incommensurable fragmentation of history precludes the expiation of the soldiers’
presence, which is essentially a demand to join past, present, and future to create the
singularity of justice from the current disjunction of the soldiers’ liminal temporality. The
spectators’ various perceptions of the soldiers’ presence conflict with others’ and not so
much defers the future as confirms its impossibility: the soldiers age before their eyes
until they become unreal, dissipating into time and ensuring the transmission of their
exploitation into a future when, once again, time will vomit what is in its belly. As with
every preceding historical messiah, these Germans were unable to perceive these events
in terms of their full historicity: not as the immediate appearance of transgressed morals
and denied rights that demanded expiation, but as an echo of others’ past transgressions
and denials. But this inability is the historical messiah’s promise: to fail his task and to
return to a subsequent present.
In A People Betrayed and The Troops Return, the present is the experience of the
Dikē that ought to be—this is, perhaps, the one commonality throughout every plot line,
that everyone searches for something to join their disjoined present. For the novel, this
search is for the interior peace of faith, which brings the soul, the only remnant of the
divine to be found within the historical, into accord with the divine order of justice.
According to the narrative voice and Becker, however, the condition of the historical
entails that the search will be as fragmented and contingent as the historical itself. Only
some will find a path to the divine, of which there are many. Others experience the
promise of the historical messiah, calling into the abyss with the intention to bring the
future into the present and create the singularity of justice, only to inevitably fail and
guarantee a subsequent present appears to echo the past’s call for justice. Consequently,
the narrator typically describes such searches as being for an affirmative conclusion from
a negative premise, absolute justice from historical fragmentation. This chapter focuses
on the representation of this search in Johannes Maus and Becker. Both are soldiers
returned from the war and temporally liminal; thus, they represent the presence of the
defeated past’s demand for expiation.
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3.1 The Historical Search for Justice
A People Betrayed engenders temporal disjointedness in first epigraph to the first
chapter: “A young man returns from war, finds nothing appealing about living in Berlin
and meets others who feel the same. Some overwrought people attack police
headquarters and find they can sleep better afterward. It is November 22, 1918” (Döblin
5). The previous chapter suggested that Benjamin likens the effect of materialist
historiography to the moment of awakening from dream-filled sleep, during which the
line between the reality of class struggle and the dream of an alternative social order is
blurred. But this experience would be limited to those for whom the historical articulation
of the past reveals the historicity of the present and its injustices. For these “overwrought
people,” however, their experience is a demand for expiation, which action relieves
temporarily and allows them to sleep, perhaps even dream. Immediately following this
epilogue, the narrator represents their experience as that of history:
Berlin was a proliferation of buildings sprawling low and somber across the sand
of Mark Bradenburg. A shabby excuse for a stream, the Spree, flowed between
them. The little river took on an iridescent black from the sewage emptied into it,
buildings turned their backs on it, sheds and coalyards lined its banks. In the
Hansa district near the zoo the world surrounding its murky, proletarian waters
opened up somewhat, and it caught a glimpse of trees and boats and was glad to
leave behind the heaps of stone that were the source of the refuse. But for some
distance out onto the plain the poor river was hemmed in again by industry, by
complexes as big as cities, where still more men and women toiled inside. (Döblin
5)
The river Spree enacts the flow of history as it is experienced by the overwrought:
through the detritus of the past, which has flowed from one present to the next, with some
enjoying fleeting moments of reprieve that are inevitably cut short by other historical
actors interrupting the river’s course. This is one of the few moments in which the
narrator describes the setting at any length; he typically limits himself to naming streets
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or landmarks and focusing on characters’ thoughts.36 Here the imagery is pervasively
passive, which overpowers the people depicted in it, reducing them to masses of men and
women, with little individuality, subject to the whims of history. The experience of
history is happenstance: the river washes away meaning as soon as it comes into view,
and individuals respond to conditions whose significance is fleeting. An opportunity
presents itself in those conditions—some overwrought people attack police headquarters.
Their relief lasts only as long as it takes the river to wash it away.
The young man to whom the narrator refers in the epigraph to the first chapter is
Maus, a soldier returned from the war and thus a temporally liminal figure whose
presence is the past’s demand for expiation. The narrator introduces Maus next to the
overwrought Berliners and returns to his narrative immediately following the river scene;
proximity is a technique that the narrator uses throughout A People Betrayed and The
Troops Return to signal characters’ relation to their immediate context.37 Maus’s
immediate context is the experience of the present as the demand for expiation, which he
echoes. Thus, the narrator’s description of Maus’s body grounds him in the historical
(and raises the theme of corporeality, which appears throughout the novel as an indication
of a character’s connection to the historical):
On this Friday, November 22nd, a former lieutenant, Maus by name, wanders
listlessly about the streets of Berlin . . .
With his youthful, rosy-cheeked face, Maus is an unprepossessing,
amiable fellow who hasn’t accomplished much in life as yet. He has powerful
limbs ready to spring into action, his gray-blue eyes have a look of candor.
(Döblin 6)
Maus is, on one hand, the prototypical proletarian and the representation of his
corporeality the embodiment of the proletarian body: his experience reflects “the
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struggling, oppressed class itself” and is thus the embodiment of that class as “the
depository of historical knowledge” (Benjamin, Illuminations 260). This is knowledge
strengthened by its historical oppression, “the sinews of its greatest strength,” knowledge
for which class struggle forms the foundation of meaning, but which the river might wash
away at any moment.
The meaning of Maus’s search for expiation is not founded on firm ground. His
past as a soldier drives his search, but it hinges on the two ways in which he articulates
that experience, both of which culminate in his feeling discarded: as part of an army of
soldiers drawn from the working class to which they return immediately following the
war, but also as part of an army of soldiers who return from the war as symbols of the
nation’s defeat. These are the terms on which Maus experiences the present as one which
demands expiation. Hofmann suggests that “The characters of Friedrich Becker and Rosa
Luxemburg are devised to carry [the novel’s search for a true and lasting peace]” and
points to Becker’s “prayerlike invocation” for peace in the first volume, Bürger und
Soldaten (Hofmann, “Revolution and Redemption” 477). However, Maus does echo this
invocation several times, albeit in somewhat different terms. Peace for Maus would be
feeling useful to this world and justice the achievement of that experience which is
usefulness: “He no longer has his hopes set on a career, he only wants to know whether
he is of any use to this world” (Döblin 6). The terms of Maus’s search are also a reminder
of man’s inherent limits, his inability to perceive and respond to the entirety of history—
to even the entirety of the present’s immediate appearance. Although Maus is attuned to
history’s demand for expiation, his response to the present is necessarily limited to his
own experience.
Tellingly, Maus’s echoes of Becker’s invocation coincide with others’ mentions
of the war, which connects his sense of expiation to his experience in the war—to the
past to which the novel’s present is subsequent. That is to say, he experiences the present
as a demand to expiate for the war. Maus first echoes Becker’s invocation in response to
Grete Gries musing on German intellectuals’ failure to resist, shortly after she recounts
the sacrifices made for nothing during the war:
“Something wrenched inside Maus . . . She’s supposed to be telling me where we
go from here. The woman’s chatter kindled a sullen anger in him, one that
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swallowed up his memory of Becker sobbing there inside the train car as they
rolled along. Peace sweet peace. He looked over at Big Ding. “So what are you
doing about [the political situation]?”
He wrinkled his brow and raised both fists. “I’m on the side of the
revolution.” (Döblin 11)
Maus interprets Gries’s criticism of the war as criticism of himself and the other soldiers,
of their failure to win the war for Germany. Thus, her musings constitute a sort of
twofold inactivity: Maus suddenly feels confronted by the prospect that he and the other
soldiers are to blame for Germany’s disjunction, but no practical suggestion for expiation
follows the accusation, only intellectual nonsense. The weight of the present’s demand
for expiation weighs so heavily on Maus that he, who initially claimed “I don’t give a
damn about the revolution” (Döblin 9), suddenly feels compelled to ask about this, the
last form of practical action mentioned that responds to the present’s disjunction. The
second echo coincides with the mention of Liebknecht:
[Ding:] “The Hohenzollerns had hoped to march victoriously through the
Brandenburg Gate at war’s end; instead, it is the proletariat that is marching. All
the thrones of Germany have toppled. The princes, the generals, the petty junkers,
the mass murderers have all crept back into their rat holes.”
The girl: “Liebknecht said that.”
Once more Becker’s words sounded in Maus’s ears: “Night. The night.
Peace is coming now. I’m glad we’ve lived to see this.”
Maus’s sullen anger. He whispered, “Those of us at the front did what we
could. We’re not to blame if other people acted like that back home.”
And his shoulder hurt him. He thought of Richard, the pilot who lay dying
in the hospital room next to his, and of Hilda, so distant now. Suddenly he had
tears in his eyes, for the whole wretched mess, and because everyone in the whole
world deserted you.
The young teacher watched his face grow pale, his lips quiver. She came
over to him and took his hand. There. She stroked his hand as he let his head sink
down onto his chest.
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A canary was singing in the next room. That made the pain all the worse
for poor Maus. He pulled his hand away.
And then suddenly everything reversed itself inside him. A decision
crashed through Maus like lightning: I’m through with this whole rotten business.
And without paying attention to his two guests he rushed over to the
bureau behind the armchairs, with the same rapid movements he always made
when fetching his belt and holster from their drawer. The mirror cast his image
back at him, the grim face, and he said in a hoarse voice as he threw the hair out
of his face with a toss of his head. “All right, let’s go. What’s it to be? I’m at your
service. It won’t be because I didn’t do my part” (Döblin 11-12).
Maus interprets Liebknecht’s calls for expiation for the war as another admonishment of
himself and the other soldiers. The thought triggers the injury he sustained during the war
and resentment over being a symbol of Germany’s defeat; the memory of Richard’s death
immediately follows, raising the possibility of his and the other working-class soldiers’
exploitation by the Hohenzollerns; and the memory of his unrequited love is another
factor contributing to Maus’s feeling of disjunction, which he might have avoided had he
not gone to war. The language the narrator uses to describe Maus’s response to his
disjunction, “like lightning,” resembles that which Luxemburg uses to describe the
Russian proletariat’s sudden development of class conscious, “as if by an electric shock”
(Luxemburg 248). However, Maus’s “spontaneity,” his suddenly siding with proletarian
action, is mere chance: the revolution is simply the first potential for practical action to
appear that responds to Maus’s experience of disjunction.
Maus is an extreme example of those who give themselves over to the historical
and become consumed by the need for action—much as Becker’s religious ecstasies are
an extreme example of Christianization. The extremity of their representation is a
reflection of their temporal liminality, the way in which they are conduits for the
present’s temporal disjunction. A telling moment immediately precedes Maus’s sudden
decision to join the revolution: when he, whose experience echoes the river of history,
with a “coalyard” on its bank, hears the canary’s song and echoes its mourning, but what
does it mourn? Rather than a justice deferred to the future, the canary’s call mourns
Maus’s forthcoming decision, one that will only prolong his sense of disjunction and
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guarantee a subsequent present in which he will need to repeat his search for expiative
action. Maus’s experience limits the extent to which he consciously understands the
song’s significance, but the mournful call he hears is the same echo for justice from
preceding presents. Much as the troops’ temporally liminal return is a fulfillment of the
temporal disjunction signalled by time’s ejection, an affirmation of the historical
messiah’s promise, Maus’s eventual and sudden decision to join a right-wing militia is a
fulfillment of the canary’s call:
And by chance Maus happened to see at a street corner that same poster Becker
had observed at the Königstor. “What is socialism? The highest goal of socialism
is the total liberation of the German people and of the whole of mankind . . .”
No, thought Maus. You won’t pull it off. I know you. No, I’ve had
enough. I’m not going to be a part of it any longer. It makes me sick.
And with a jerk, Maus was free of his doubts. The way lay open, the
direction was clear. He knew where he wanted to go. A few days before a
comrade had told him about something going on in Westphalia. They were
forming a corps of volunteers who loved discipline and the fatherland. You could
find out about it at an office on Fasanenstrasse.
That’s what I’ll do, Maus decided.
. . . Maus marched. He was sure, wild and vengeful. (Döblin 598)
The socialism poster anchors this episode’s fulfillment. Shortly after having first seen the
poster, Becker evokes it during his confrontation with Maus: “Becker did not notice the
gaze with which Maus was examining him. Becker thought: look how the world follows
you about. There he stands, my bailiff. He’s come to collect debts” (Döblin 579).
Although Becker observes Maus’s presence, the way in which he echoes history’s
demand for expiation, the confrontation which follows affirms history’s fragmentation.
Both are temporally liminal soldiers, highly attuned to the present’s disjunction—should
not one’s expiation resonate with the other? Instead, Becker confronts Maus with the
truth of history’s incommensurable fragmentation: “‘The institutions of the state, and of
the economy too, have most certainly been very rotten, extraordinarily rotten. But when
are they ever very good? Yes, when are they good? They’ve never been good’” (Döblin
586). There is no explicit point during the confrontation at which Maus abandons the
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revolution, but it would seem to coincide with the moment he believes the confrontation
is actually about Hilda: “Shall we not for once really be you and me, have a really
personal conversation now, just this once. You’re talking about Hilda, aren’t you? At the
root of it you think you have to preach these sermons to me on account of her”” (Döblin
594). The actual “root of it” is the abyss which supports Maus’s concerns and allows him
to transition from one to the other with relative ease—to whichever will provide a
moment of relief. Thus, the socialism poster anchors this episode as an expression of
history’s truth, the various ways in which an historical intention to create the singularity
of justice actually contributes to the fragmentation of history, experienced here as the
present’s disjunction: the push the poster gives Maus to join the right-wing militia is
inspired “by chance,” swept onto his path by the flow of history, the magnitude of
socialism’s messianic promise. The narrator’s anchoring of this episode around the
socialism poster is clearly intended to suggest that a present in which the search for
justice could lead to two, such contradictory actions could not be anything but
fragmented.

3.2

The Theological Search for Justice

In a sense, the title of The Troops Return’s final book could not be a date, not
using the historical logic the novel has employed to this point: the book’s contents span
several years, from the contemporaneous negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles and the
League of Nations to the death of Woodrow Wilson. While the novel’s polemic on the
significance of history appears throughout the narrative, it culminates in this chapter in
the narrator’s assertion of the truth of history’s incommensurable fragmentation.
Consequently, the only justice and peace to be had within the historical is to be found in
the spiritual or theological—in the interior peace of faith, which brings the soul, the only
remnant of the divine to be found within the historical, into accord with the divine order
of justice. The final book’s title, “Last Echoes, Sequel,” suggests that this truth is the
result of the negotiations it depicts: the vengeful Treaty of Versailles and the short-lived
League of Nations effectively silence the echoes of history’s call for justice, but on terms
that guarantee a sequel. Wilson leads this present effort for justice within the historical.
The narrator also represents him in temporally liminal terms, as he comes from a past
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which is future to Europe: “The year 1620 lived in his soul, the year the proud Pilgrim
fathers had pushed off from Europe, and three hundred years of unbroken and free
growth of American humanity lived there too, as did the principles of Jefferson and
Lincoln and his nation’s dead, the men he had had to cast into the maw of the Moloch
that was Europe” (Döblin 312). Wilson approaches these negotiations with the spirit of
America’s past—the future that Europe never realized, that forced America to disavow
the old continent in order to realize itself on the new, and that Wilson hopes can finally
be realized in Europe: “There was to be an end to the corruption of the old continent.
Europe lay exhausted and mangled. The messenger of conscience, the representative of
the country that was ‘not a geographical fact, but a moral one’” (Döblin 312). The
narrator offers two accounts of Wilson’s preparedness for this task:
Woodrow Wilson was aware of the magnitude of his task.
He was a lonely, solitary man. He felt God had laid a heavy burden upon
him. He was determined to bear it . . .
The left half of his face had developed a nervous tic. His eyes lay haunted
and deep behind his glasses.
Wilson did not know what awaited him in Europe. (Döblin 312)
Theologically, Wilson understands the magnitude of his task: the monumental task of
bringing a lasting peace that would the first and last to a continent rife with the historical
fragmentation of war. But he does not fully comprehend the practical or historical
magnitude of his task, of “what awaited him,” which the narrator suggests immediately
after mentioning Wilson’s twitch or corporeality. What awaits is the multiple conflicting
calls for justice, many of which come from those who experience the present as the
demand for justice Wilson was to bring. Thus, the tic indicates a body not long for this
world; indeed, Wilson’s condition worsens as the negotiations begin to fall apart. He
approaches negotiations with an assuredness based in a theological conception of politics
that is impracticable in the historical. In this way, Wilson is an echo of Becker: whereas
Wilson begins with a theological sense of politics that slowly decays, as everything
historical does, Becker’s point of departure is the historical knowledge of philology. But
their trajectories are inverted: as Wilson eventually acknowledges the incompatibility of
theology to politics, and Becker finds the only peace available to the historical, a practical
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peace that brings the soul into accord with the divine order of justice through faith and
harmonizes the believer’s experience of the present.
One indication of this echo is the two mentions of the ancient Greek myth of
Antaeus, first in reference to Becker and later in reference to Wilson. Son of the sea god
Poseidon and the earth goddess Gaea, Antaeus drew his strength from direct contact to
the earth, his mother. He would challenge passersby to wrestling matches and was
undefeated until he challenged Hercules.38 Upon realizing that Antaeus drew his strength
from the earth, the divine hero locked Antaeus in a bear hug that rendered him unable to
touch the ground. Antaeus is a figure whose strength is derived fully from the (historical)
earth. In November 1918, the subtext of the Antaeus myth is that only the divine can
overcome the historical, which on its own is a continuum of battles, such as those to
which Antaeus challenges others. Both allusions are made in reference to the most
theologically inclined characters in A People Betrayed and The Troops Return; thus, they
also speak to the nature of the relationship between the divine and the historical. The
narrator makes the first mention in A People Betrayed: “He no longer dragged himself
about like a wretched skeleton with a waxen skull . . . Aided by canes in both hands, he
lifted his legs more quickly and vigorously. He could walk for certain stretches without
tiring, and every success spurred him on. He credited it all to Berlin—Antaeus on his
home soil” (Döblin 90). More than simply recounting that Becker connects the
improvement in his condition to his return home, the narrator confirms Becker’s
historicity, that he is a flesh and blood man. This confirmation is significant because
Becker’s relationship to reality is a vehicle for the novel’s polemic: the strength of his
connection to reality is directly connected to his search for justice and his expression of
futurity as a soldier. The narrator’s second mention of Antaeus occurs in a remark
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge makes to himself. Historically, Lodge was instrumental in
the failure of the Treaty of Versailles and keeping the United States out of the League of
Nations. Upon seeing Wilson after his return from treaty negotiations in Europe, Lodge
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Typically referred to as Heracles in ancient Greek myth, Hercules is the name more common in the
Western tradition and the one used in a later reference to the myth of Antaeus in The Troops Return.
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remarks that “Only once did Professor Wilson wander into the fields of mythology, only
to mistake Antaeus for Hercules” (Döblin 628). The implication is that Wilson entered
negotiations expecting them to unfold according to divine ideals, which would be
meaningful to a divine hero such as Hercules, but found himself pitted against Antaeus,
the European political leaders who were more interested in settling historical scores that
would establish a justice to their liking. Lodge’s evocation of the myth also undermines
the notion of the United States as “the country that was ‘not a geographical fact, but a
moral one’” (Döblin 312): even this “moral” country, this ostensible realization of the
future, is caught up in history’s fragmentation. Whereas Wilson’s association with
Antaeus demonstrates that he was woefully unprepared to respond to the practical
conditions of negotiations, that he comprehends the relationship between the divine and
the historical, Becker’s association is limited to an historical matter, the healing of the
body from injuries sustained during the war and, we might say, “render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.”
Whereas Maus’s corporeality grounds his search for justice, Becker’s search for
justice is shaped by his background in philology, which leads him to the foundation of
historical meaning. Here, the war has exposed longstanding and substantial faults:
“During peacetime you prepared [to be conscripted], in the midst of your Kant and Plato.
And you—don’t question. You don’t question, you go, you obey. The agency that issues
the orders is more than God. You listen, more than to God” (Döblin 48). Becker’s
argument is an interrogation of historical meaning: what does it mean, for instance, that
men who are educated in such high ideals can still commit such acts which directly
contravene them? How can these mutual incompatibilities coexist? What are the
implications for life in the historical? Becker’s colleague responds “But there you’ve just
admitted . . . The government is the guilty party and ought to be, has to be, changed”
(Döblin 49). Thus, he fails to understand that the ostensibly proper ascription of guilt is
meaningless to Becker, as it implies the possibility of justice:
Becker stands up. The bookcase. He reads the titles, the names. Sophocles, Dante,
Kant, somber fear stirs in the background.
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Where to get help? Where to get help? The books are mute. The great
minds point toward the abyss, who will lead me across the chasm? This
uneasiness, confusion, physical fear. (Döblin 331)
The historical foundation for meaning, the narrator suggests, is impermanent, hovering
over an abyss, essentially meaningless, for nothing vouchsafes any meaning it deploys.
Justice is so clearly unavailable when its rendering could entail injustice. Thus, Becker’s
experience of temporal disjointedness is not unlike Hamlet’s, except that he seeks a
justice which would necessarily mean the experience of time as harmony, the preclusion
of disjunction. In this way, Becker’s theological epistemology differs from Benjamin’s
on the matter of man’s access to divine meaning. For Becker, man’s connection to God’s
divine meaning is more direct than the recognition of non-sensuous similarities discussed
in the previous chapter; the novel might consider non-sensuous similarities more akin to
the transliteration of one language to another while maintaining the grammar and syntax
of the original, producing nonsense interspersed with fragments of meaning. In other
words, the historical translation of the divine would produce the historical. We might
attribute this difference to Becker’s operating on Christian and not Jewish theological
principles. If, as Benjamin suggests, only the messiah consummates history, Christ has
only somewhat repaired man’s relationship to the divine. Man has not been reinstated to
the linguistic condition that Adam enjoyed, but there is a bridge to meaning that is
somewhat more direct than Benjamin’s non-sensuous similarities—belief in Christ: “For
God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him
may not perish but may have eternal life” (New Oxford Annotated Bible, John 3:16).
These are certainly the terms in which Becker eventually expresses his turn to
Christianity:
“Do I believe? Is that faith? That there is a heaven and a hell, that there are
justice, punishment and grace, that God is not distant. And He is the same God
who created the world. Is that faith?”
He went to the window and had to look out. There it is again, Berlin. A
great many things are happening here, here and elsewhere in the nation. The war
is over. But what I see here is just one small piece. There is also a God and grace
and justice. That is what holds the world together, those are its clamps. That is
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what makes it endure, what pulses without contradiction through the world from
heaven to earth to hell. It is the world’s fundamental law, its axis. (Döblin 512)
The extent to which Christ repairs man’s connection to God is that he must believe in
Christ, bringing his soul into alignment with the divine order of justice, which he
experiences as the justice and peace of redemption.
The contents of the last book of The Troops Return are what Döblin would call
the interpretation or making use of history, an expression of what the novel wants with
history. If the historical example of the November Revolution can be read as a specific
example of the appearance of history’s demand for justice in that moment, Döblin’s novel
might be said to represent the silencing of that echo with a further deferral to the future,
which entails the arrival of another subsequent present experienced as the demand for
justice. However, as I suggest above, the novel’s denial of absolute justice for history
precludes the very possibility of such a future. Rather, the final book gestures repeatedly
to the truth of history’s incommensurable fragmentation. One such episode is Wilson’s
contemplation of politics and theology, in which he defines the practice of politics by the
divine’s negation of history:
My father and grandfather had the task of bringing Holy Scripture to people. That
was the way, the office they employed, to educate people. It fell to me to study, to
learn—and to get involved in politics. I could not keep my knowledge to myself. I
admit that there is always a certain impatience and need to dominate that drive
people into politics. Where, however, does the real difference lie between my way
of doing things and that of my father and grandfather? They went at things from
the inside, from the center. They had a smelter for melting the ancient holy truths
by which they could make people fluid and mobile. We politicians don’t have it
so easy. We work from the outside. We break people more than we form them.”
(Döblin 637-38)
Wilson’s contemplation comes in light of his failure in Europe, which affirms the
qualities inherent to political practice: if the divine’s unified permanence is the
precondition of its unifying power, the fragmentation and contingency of the historical
renders the practice of politics necessarily fragmented and fragmenting.
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This affirmation of the fragmentation inherent to the political is itself an echo of
earlier events, which hinges on a moment of simultaneity between Wilson and Becker in
the “Posters” section: “In the course of the morning Becker went out onto the street. It
was the same hour that the train carrying President Woodrow Wilson, the peace-maker,
pulled into Paris at the Bois de Boulogne station” (Döblin 575-76). This simultaneity is
significant as it is one of the few instances of such an effect, which the first volume
frequently establishes using montage. As Helmuth Kiesel notes, “the second part was
made more lucid through subsequent rearrangements of parts . . . The feeling of
simultaneity and diverse perspectives was lost as was the sense of anonymous
revolutionary events resulting from an almost incomprehensible number of variously
motivated individual occurrences” (Kiesel 219). In this instance, however, simultaneity
contributes to lucidity, as it gestures to the relationship between Becker and Wilson to
suggest that understanding them relies to some extent on reading them comparatively. In
this instance, Becker refers to Wilson as he polemicizes on justice as a precursor to peace
in the immediately preceding section, “Relief”:
There must be punishment [for the atrocities committed in the war]. People must
be able to feel that there is justice. If people will not acknowledge God in heaven
and pay no heed to the laws of this world, then they have to be dealt with like
trained dogs, horses and elephants. If you can’t make human beings reasonable
and good, you can at least make them bearable. That can be done with
individuals, that is what upbringing is about. But what happens when they band
together, or when they form power blocs, the state? What can you do with the
state? Each one with its pride, its arrogance, each with its border and its greed,
what can come of that? Perhaps one ought to take their borders away from them.
But how? There is Wilson. But even in antiquity there were the small Greek
cities, each of them a state, and they tore one another to pieces—and all the while
stood at the height of learning. They founded a league of states. It didn’t work.
The Macedonians had to come, the barbarians from the north, to subjugate them
and take their freedom from them. Then they were unified and there was peace,
for a while. (Döblin 574)
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What inspires Becker’s polemic is an article detailing “the refusal of foreign academics to
work together with Germans at congresses in the future” (Döblin 574). In a newspaper
left by the Westphalian chaplain, the article alludes to the Peace of Westphalia which has
since evolved into the modern international law of Westphalian sovereignty.39 To one
extent, the conflicts of modern nations echo those which the Peace of Westphalia
resolved, which echoes the conflicts of ancient Greece; and that conflict, in the putative
home of Western thought, is echoed by academics’ hostilities toward each other. In this
way, the novel’s polemic becomes about what chronology reveals: that despite the
various forms the political has taken throughout history, it always tends toward
fragmentation and conflict, with only rare and temporary moments of that peace which
unity produces. Here, unity is a cognate for justice insofar as it refers to that which
tempers the disjunctive experience of injustice, however temporarily, and peace is the
experience of that just or unified future. This points back to the essential incompatibility
between the divine and the historical, as even historical unity is premised upon
fragmentation: the Greeks’ unity was within the fragmentation of their opposition to the
Macedonians. The truth of history guarantees that political unities will always fragment
and devolve into chaos, whether that chaos be internal, civil unrest or between other state
unities.
Shortly thereafter, Wilson and Henri Poincaré bloviate about peace in the
“Posters” section: “Poincaré, the president of the French Republic, will rise . . . and . . .
speak of the misery and sorrow of this war that has ended in victory. Peace must bring
with it reparations and guarantees against a recurrence of the dangers of the past . . . Mr.
Wilson rises, speaks . . . He, too, mentions the new peace that must build the basis for the
freedom and happiness of countless people” (Döblin 576). Poincaré invokes a notion of
peace in which unity or justice is premised on the other’s disjunction, the harmony of
disharmony, whereas Wilson posits a peace which produces justice like the autogenesis
of virgin birth: not a justice that will produce a lasting peace, but a lasting peace that will
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The Peace of Westphalia was a number of peace treaties which included the creation of international
boundaries.
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produce justice, the gift of peace given with the expectation of justice. Peace is the
experience of Dikē, a present without presence. The peace Wilson proposes is antithetical
to the fragmentary practice of politics from the outside; it constitutes an affirmative
conclusion from a negative premise, that is, absolute justice from historical
fragmentation. This moment finds its fulfillment in Wilson’s later contemplation on the
nature of theology and politics; that is to say, Wilson’s failure to forge lasting peace for
Europe fulfills the historical messiah’s promise to fail his and to return to a subsequent
present—the “Sequel” gestured to in the title of the last book.
Although Becker finds justice in the divine, he remains an historical man of flesh
and blood: if the divine is the axis of justice, the question is whether the peace of that
justice can be experienced in the historical present. The answer is a tentative yes, but that
experience is limited to the interior peace of faith, which brings the soul into accord with
the divine order of justice. Becker’s search for that justice does engender the soldier’s
fading from reality: his search occurs mostly as encounters with Satan, who appears as
the Mysterious Brazilian, a lion, and a rat, encouraging Becker to join the spirit world,
that is, to become “unreal” but by the flesh and blood method of suicide. Thus, Becker’s
attempted suicide can be read as his acceptance that justice is wholly unavailable in the
historical: if the truth of history is its fragmentation, how is one to act consistently and
without fear of committing evil? His decision to commit suicide forecloses the possibility
of any further missteps and adopts the novel’s language of temporal disjointedness: “‘I’m
vomiting up my whole self. I refuse to accept this existence. I refuse to accept this gift
with its fake ego named Friedrich Becker. The package will be returned to sender’”
(Döblin 479). The decision to refuse this gift is not a disavowal of history, but a tacit
capitulation to the expiation of history as a matter of personal guilt and responsibility:
suicide is the only means to expiate the extent to which Becker contributes to the
disjunction of the present. In this sense, his ego or conscious thinking self is only
meaningless fragment within the historical, consumed by his resulting indecision and
inactivity; the only resolution available is to become “unreal.”
Becker’s survival, however, is, as he suspects, due to God’s intervention: “‘That
man’ has not succeeded. Then there was someone who was stronger than “that man.”
Then it was not a defeat after all” (Döblin 486). Indeed, at the literary level, the triumph
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is the novel’s polemic transcending the form of an historical novel. Johannes Tauler, the
fourteenth-century Alsatian Catholic mystic and another spiritual manifestation in
November 1918,40 suggests that Becker’s search for justice and peace through the
expiation of his personal guilt and responsibility will be both his downfall and his saving
grace: “‘You are a man of high, proud temper, you will accept no answer but one that
makes you higher, prouder still. You have entered through the Gate of Dread and
Despair. Your pride has led you along this path. You will not find the truth in any other
way’” (Döblin 441). Becker survives his confrontation with Satan because he was on not
the but a path to God, who saw his suffering and saved him: “Then God intervened and
saved me, and woke the core of my numbed ego. Ah, it is not an empty shell, this life,
there is seriousness about it” (Döblin 510). Thus, A People Betrayed and The Troops
Return’s polemic is the truth of history: its incommensurable fragmentation, within which
the believer can still find the interior peace of faith, which brings the soul into accord
with the divine order of justice. And the moments preceding Becker’s spiritual
denouement in The Troops Return serve as an affirmation of the novel’s polemic:
Becker’s pronouncement that “‘The world has a place in the order of justice’”
acknowledges the possibility of peace, but the acknowledgement that “‘this world must
die in order to live in God’” limits that peace. Shortly thereafter, Becker experiences a
sudden clarity of mind: “Adsum, here I am. I am a part of reality. This is it” (Döblin 597).
He finds himself in the present but also “connected to the easy-going, proud Becker, the
first-lieutenant from the war, lying among the wounded and helpless in the military
hospital” (Döblin 597): he experiences the inner-peace of the faithful, which neutralizes
the present’s disjunction.

40

Hofmann observes that, in the third volume, Tauler “will subsequently be Becker’s spiritual mentor”
(Hofmann, “Revolution and Redemption” 477). See also Hofmann, “Revolution and Redemption” 477fn14.
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